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Abstract
Title of Dissertation: Mergers in Liner Shipping – Strategic options available to
Indian Shipping.
Degree: MSc.
This dissertation is a study of the spate of mergers taking place in the liner shipping
industry and the options these leave for a small operator the size of ‘The Shipping
Corporation of India Limited.’
A brief look has been taken at the measures liner operators have been taking to
overcome the poor earnings from this industry. The evolution of the conference
system and the global alliances has been examined here.
The liner industry has witnessed a number of mergers recently, and the motive
driving these mergers and the rationalisation that has come to the industry has been
looked into. Additionally case studies of three major mergers have also been
presented for benchmarking purposes. A mention of major trends that are currently
affecting the industry has also been made.
The dissertation is to propose a business strategy for Indian liner companies, hence
the Indian scenario has been studied. Current status of the sole Indian operator, SCI
has also been analysed with emphasis on the capability of the company to continue
in the turbulent times in which many companies have given up. Options available to
SCI have thus been evaluated and a course of action is proposed.
KEYWORDS: Liner, Container shipping, Mergers, Strategy, India, SCI.
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11. 
Introduction
“Container shipping is like a poker game - you just have to keep putting more
and more money on the table which you are about to lose."
Late Sir Y-K Pao, one time chairman of World Wide Shipping.1
A key feature of liner business has been capacity management. From an economic
view point, what makes this form of business different from bulk shipping is, in liner
shipping there is an obligation to stick to a timetable, which makes capacity
inflexible. While in tramp, owners can respond quickly to supply/demand imbalances
by moving their least efficient ships to lay up, a liner company has to keep up with its
schedules and has to run its vessels to stick to the schedule, no matter even if the
vessels are moving empty. This inflexibility does not leave any leeway for the liner
operator when there is a seasonal variation in cargo in some trade routes.
Another aspect of liner business has been the problem of pricing. Since the liner
market has a huge fragmented customer base, it is not practicable for operators to
negotiate rates for each consignment, which is not a problem in the tramp sector
where the customers are big in size and shipowners move from trade to trade
negotiating rates with each customer.
These two limitations, inflexible capacity and fixed prices have always dominated
the liner industry. Revenues have been highly volatile, with cash flows frequently
affected by trade cycles, seasonal cycles and trade imbalances. Industry operating
profits never exceeded 6 percent in the last decade2 and there are very few liner
operators who have been able to produce consistent, acceptable levels of
                                                
1 Lim,S.M. 1998. p.361.
2profitability. To quote Ray Miles, CEO of CP Ships, twelve of the top twenty
container lines suffered losses in 1998, while seven made insufficient profits and just
one (CP Ships) made a satisfactory return.2 This phase of dismal returns has driven
away a number of established players from this business.
In order to have a stream of positive revenues, operators have been trying to
influence the market forces. There has been array of experiments with some
focussing on the revenue side by fixing prices for the transportation, while others
tackling capacity by fixing up trade shares so that companies do not compete for
each other’s cargo. One obvious strategy for this has been the formation of cartels
and liner shipping has such co-operation schemes known as ‘Conferences’. In
addition to the conference system, liner operators have also learnt the art of making
friends with enemies, and competitors have worked together in the form of consortia
and alliances as discussed in chapter 2 of this dissertation.
When the alliances were not able to result in desired savings, the industry witnessed
weaker players surrendering to the more ambitious ones and thus started the era of
mergers and acquisitions. Chapter 3 discusses this form of consolidation that the
industry has witnessed in the last few years.
Chapter 4 takes a look at the current trends that have affected liner shipping in the
recent past, and what is in hold for the future.
Since the dissertation is to find out a future course of action for Indian liner
companies, Chapter 5 is an introduction to Indian companies in this business and
the role played by those in the international arena. This chapter takes a look at The
Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), which is the only Indian company having a
presence in the international liner business today.
With the industry witnessing a number of takeovers, and the liner business not
giving adequate returns to SCI, it becomes imperative to assess the options
                                                                                                                                         
2Drewry Shipping Consultants, October 1999.
3available to the company to overcome the turbulence. An analysis of the options
available before SCI is, therefore, discussed at chapter 6.
Chapter 7, presents the conclusion as to the option best suited for SCI, and this
forms the recommendations for implementation.
42.
Co-operation schemes in liner shipping
2.1 Conferences
The advent of steam ships brought a new dimension in shipping as it enabled
operators to offer fixed sailing schedules, which they were not able to do with sail
boats earlier, as those depended upon weather conditions. Steam ships had greater
cargo handling capacity, and at the same time required less sailing days. This
coupled with the opening of the Suez-canal in 1869 meant a high increase in cargo
carrying capacity of the world merchant fleet. Unfortunately, the trade could not keep
pace with the growing capacity, and the result was surplus tonnage on most trade
routes. Operators, in a bid to attract customers resorted to rate cutting and freight
rates soon came down to the level of direct operating costs. This was murderous
and the only way shipowners’ could get over it was to join hands. The result was an
association of shipping lines operating on the UK-Calcutta route formed in 1875,
which was the first shipping conference.1
Before the conference system there was absolutely no regulation of prices, as the
customer base was big and operators negotiated different rates with different
shippers. The conference system was, therefore, a very helpful alternative in this
industry as it established freight by limiting rate wars, and permitting a regular and
steady service. These were basically associations of mutually competitive liner
operators, maintained for the purpose of controlling competition among their
members, and for strengthening those members through co-operative action in their
competitive fight against non-member carriers.
                                                
1 Herman, A. 1983.
5In order to achieve the objective of controlling competition, the conferences adopted
a series of measures as follows:
• Price fixation.
• Restriction on membership.
• Pooling arrangements - cargo and revenue pools.
• Active enforcement of conference agreements.
These arrangements were not received co-ordially by both shipowners and shippers
alike. Small operators who were not admitted to the conference system due to
limited membership were the first to come out in opposition to this system. And as
the conference system set uniform rates regardless of the size of shippers, the big
ones started to complain as they had a long lasting relationship with their carriers,
which offered them discounted freights. These shippers turned to non-member
liners, which shipped their cargo at lower rates. Conference lines, in order not to
lose big regular customers, had to offer rebates on the conference rates to these
customers and thus started the trend of offering rebates on conference rates. In
order to satisfy big customers, schemes like the deferred rebate system and the
dual contract rate have been devised in the past. These ensured that the
conferences were market responsive, i.e. meeting the changing needs of the
shippers and at the same time remaining an effective tool of managing freight rates.2
Liner conferences with typically closed membership were explicitly designed to limit
competition among shipowners thereby creating a structure with the characteristics
of a cartel. These are, however, exempted from anti-trust legislation as there has
been broad consensus that liner shipping is an important facilitator of international
trade and conferences are necessary to ensure the regularity, reliability and
frequency of services. On a global scale, conferences have been regulated by the
‘UNCTAD Code of Liner Conferences’, which came into force in 1983. The anti-trust
exemption has been the bone of contention for the shippers council, which has been
trying at all forums to abolish this privilege enjoyed by the conferences.
                                                
2 Juda, L. 1983.
6Conferences, it should be mentioned here, operate within strict regulatory
guidelines. An example of this, is the European Union framework which allows
conferences to fix rates for the ocean leg of transportation of goods only. Operators
in multimodal transport cannot have an agreement on tariffs for the inland leg of the
transportation network, and any agreement on the same runs the risk of attracting
huge penalties running into a high percentage of the operator’s revenues.
In modern times, the role played by conferences is unfortunately reduced and these
have degenerated into bodies meant to fix tariffs. Tariff setting was the major
function of conferences in the past and member companies stuck to these rates
thereby ensuring some credibility to this set-up. However, the advent of
containerisation, among other things made shipping companies offer differential
rates as per the needs of individual customers and shipping companies, in practice
consider conference rates as indicative rates only. While conferences have been
becoming inactive over the years the death knell has been sounded by the ‘Ocean
Shipping Reforms Act’ implemented in the USA last year. Shipping conferences
earlier had to disclose the terms of contract specifying rates its member companies
charge shippers, and in similar fashion non-conference liner companies had to file
the rates with the Federal Maritime Commission. OSRA 1998, however, allows
shipping companies to enter into confidential contracts with shippers. This means,
while everybody has access to know about the details of contract between the
shipper and the shipowner earlier, it is no longer public information. Nobody can
know how much a shipping company charges its shippers, and hence the tariff
fixation holds no meaning.3
Thus, the question now is what does a conference do? While there still exist big
conferences on the main trade routes, critics say the death knell has already been
sounded. As commented by Gunter Casjens, Ceo Hapag Lloyd4 “Conferences have
ceased to exist because basically their main purpose of agreeing collectively on
rates is not being done anymore”.
                                                
3 Bascombe, A. 1998, September.
4 Boyes, J.R.C. 1999, April.
72.2 Consortia
While conferences were very affective tool of bringing discipline to the liner industry
in the early days, the advent of containerisation necessitated further co-operation
within companies. One of the important consequences of containerisation was the
increased capital intensity of liner industry. Containerisation led to the development
of the hub-and-spoke system, which required high capacity and high frequency on
the main trade routes. A weekly service on any of the Far-East - Europe, Far East-
USA, Europe - USA sector requires at least 8 to 12 vessels. A weekly service for
Asia-Europe for example, would require at least eight post-panamax carriers and 3
sets of containers per vessel. This entails an investment of about US$750 mn for
just one string (estimated at US$65 mn per vessel and US$1,500 per container).
And that is not the end, as given the strong growth pattern larger vessels would be
required to meet the additional cargo volume in the future. Shipowners, therefore,
would be faced with a task of replacing their fleet every 5-10 years, which means
more money again. Unfortunately, the track record of profitability in liner shipping
has been so low in the past that no shipowner dares to put in so much money into
such a venture.
Shipowners, therefore, experimented with different degrees of co-operation within
competing companies, depending upon the requirements of individual routes and an
individual company’s position therein. Some successful forms of co-operations have
been
• Slot Purchase
• Slot Sharing
• Vessel Sharing Agreements
• Joint Services
Of the varying levels of co-operations popular in the liner industry, ‘Consortia’ which
was basically an operational, technical and commercial co-operation of shipping
companies on a particular trade route, has been a very successful arrangement.
Under this arrangement two or more companies operating on a trade route shared
capacity and technical capability among themselves, which lowered the costs for
one individual owner. Operators pooled in their vessels and each line received an
8allocation that was proportionate to its own input, on each vessel running in the pool.
With several strings in operation, carriers were thus in a position to offer a wider
range of services than before. Apart from benefiting due to economies of scale,
carriers were also able to restrict competition by raising barriers to entry.
Consortia remained as the most successful form of agreement between liner
companies until 1990-91, when one of the major consortia on the east-west route of
Trio, Scandutch and Ace group broke up.5 This left liner companies to operate
individually, once again, after having tasted the benefits of offering services in
collaboration with others. What followed was a period of experimentation, until the
novel concept of ‘alliances’ was launched in the mid-nineties.
2.3 Alliances
One of the major limitations of consortia was that it operated only on a specific trade
route. The industry needed closer partnerships and it was difficult to find a stable
relationship that could have led to substantial cost savings. To make substantial
savings, the co-operation had to be extended beyond mere vessel sharing on one
single route. This resulted in the birth of the alliances in May 1994, when four of  the
world’s major liner operators viz. American President Lines (APL), Orient Overseas
Container Liner (OOCL), Mitsui OSK Lines (MOL) and Royal Nedlloyd announced
the formation of the Global Alliance. This was a pioneering co-operation on a much
larger scale and other companies rightly accepted this concept which was there to
stay in the industry. Close on the heels of the Global Alliance, three other major
alliances were immediately formed involving 12 of the 20 major liner companies, and
the industry had never seen agreements on this scale earlier6.
As against earlier forms of collaboration, which were trade specific, the alliances
covered more than one trade lane extending to global coverage. The alliances came
as a succour to the depleting fortune of liner companies as freight rates were hardly
increasing in real terms (in the long term), which put pressure on companies to cut
                                                
5 Drewry Shipping Consultants. 2000, October.
6 Fairplay Publications, 2000.
9down on costs. Although the earlier forms of co-operation were formed with the
objective of cutting down costs, those basically shared ship related costs only i.e.
operating, voyage or capital. These shared costs constitute only 30 percent of the
total cost to the shipowner. Thus the responsibility of putting a tab on the remaining
70 percent was still on the individual shipowner. This huge chunk of 70 percent cost
could be shared by having a greater degree of co-operation, and the alliance
concept was born to address this issue only7. Alliances have successfully managed
to bring some of these cost heads into the ambit of co-operation.
The alliances were intended to be long-term ventures and companies seemed to
work in tandem until 1996, when the troubled liner divisions of P&O and Royal
Nedlloyd, members of the Grand and Global alliance respectively, decided to merge.
While this sparked off a realignment of membership within the alliance, the matter
got confounded later when Neptune Orient Lines, then a member of Grand alliance,
took over APL, a member of the Global Alliance. A round of musical chairs ensued
thereafter and there have been a number of changes since 1996. Major alliances in
operation today are at Table 2.1.
                                                
7 Drewry Shipping Consultants. 1999, October.
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Table 2.1
Alliances in Liner Shipping
Grand alliance Hapag-Lloyd
NYK Line
Orient Overseas Container Liner
P&O Nedlloyd
Malaysia International Shipping Corporation
                             (Europe-Asia trades only)
New World Alliance American President Lines
Hyundai Merchant Marine
Mitsui OSK Lines.
United Alliance Cho Yang
DSR-Senator
Hanjin Shipping Co.
United Arab Shipping Co. (US-Mediterranean-Middle
east & Europe-Middle East only)
Unnamed Cosco
K-Line
Yang Ming
Unnamed CMA-CGM
Norasia Line
National Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia
Source: Fairplay Publications
The alliances are primarily concentrated on the east-west trade routes only and
there is not much co-operation on the north-south trade at present. Moreover, apart
from being a member of the alliance on one route, there has been cross-alliance co-
operation like vessel sharing agreements of companies on routes not covered by the
alliance. It is, therefore, wondered how long will these ‘marriages of convenience’
last as there still exists a huge disparity between members coming from different
countries. Each has regional expertise, which gives them a competitive edge over
others in marketing their services. The inequality of members is clearly visible with
P&O Nedlloyd dominating the Grand alliance, APL dominating the New World
Alliance and Hanjin dominating the United Alliance. In order to have the alliances
last, the balance of power within members has to be very stable, and long-term
stability is absolutely necessary if members want these co-operations to result in
cost savings.
11
Liner companies have been trumpeting in public about the advantages of less
investment in tonnage and even boxes and chassis accrued by being in an alliance.
However, the alliances have their own set of disadvantages, the most prominent
being the problem of setting up realistic sailing schedules acceptable to individual
carriers. It is very difficult to arrive at a common schedule which would be
acceptable and of benefit to members disparate in size and functioning, and coming
from different countries which means each has a different set of priorities. Arriving at
a consensus is more difficult on matters concerning tonnage to be deployed or
ordered, port rotation, frequency, joint use of terminals, and freight policies. Lines
have candidly complained of alliances entailing time-consuming meetings, slow
decision making, bureaucracy and looking too much inward8. It may be highlighted
here that it is not necessary to be in an alliance for achieving cost savings as three
of the world’s five largest companies, Maersk-Sealand (from end 1999), Evergreen
and Mediterranean Shipping Company operate independently outside any alliance9.
The alliances have long-term agreements of ten years, but it was the same for the
earlier alliances too, which did not last half that period even. It is feared that the
ongoing phase of consolidation in liner shipping may see another cross alliance
merger which will trigger off the round of musical chairs again.
                                                
8 Fairplay Publications, 2000.
9 Fossey, J. 1998, February.
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3.
Mergers and Acquisitions
3.0 While the seventies and eighties marked the evolution of strong independent
carriers, the mid-nineties saw the development of the multi-trade alliances on a
global scale. Since the second half of the nineties the pattern has been shifting from
mere co-operation to full scale mergers. The trend was triggered off by deregulation
(e.g. opposition by the European Commission to door-to-door conference tariffs,
OSRA 1998 etc.), and the resulting further erosion of the conference system. Liner
shipping is thus being transformed to a deregulated market structure having few big
players and a number of small fragmented ones. With so many players in the game,
key success factors in this business today are cost leadership and the quality of
logistics prices. Small players have found it difficult to survive through the rate war
and opted to sell off as the prudent strategy. This is evident from the number of
mergers which took place in the second half of the last decade, enumerated in Table
3.1.
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Table 3.1
Mergers and Acquisitions in Liner Shipping since 1996
Purchaser Company Acquired Price
(US$ Mil.)
1996 P&O
Transportacion Maritima Mexicana
Compagnie Maritime d’Affrètement
Royal Nedlloyd
Flota Mercante Grancolombiana
Compagnie Générale Maritime 3
1997 Hanjin Shipping
CP Ships
CP Ships
Neptune Orient Lines
DSR-Senator Lines
Lykes Lines
Conship Container Lines
American President Lines
35
110
825
1998 P&O Nedlloyd
CP Ships
Safmarine
Hamburg Sud
Evergreen
D’Amico
CP Ships
Hamburg Sud
CMA-CGM
Blue Star Line
Ivaran Lines
Safmarine Container Line
                      (part purchase)
South Seas Steamship Co.
Lloyd Triestino
Italia di Navigazione
Australia New-Zealand Direct
Line
Alianca Transportes
ANL Container Line
100~146
29
55
57
100~120
6
1999 Maersk Line
P&O Nedlloyd
Hamburg Sud
Safmarine Container Line
Compania Sud Americana
Compania Sud Americana
Hamburg Sud
Hamburg Sud
Maersk Line
Hamburg Sud
Safmarine Container Lines
Tasman Express Line
Barbican Line (part)
Barbican Line (part)
Grupo Libra (Liner only)
Montemar SA (Liner only)
Transroll Navegacao SA
South Pacific Container Line
Sea-Land
Crowley American Transport
(part)
240
800
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants & Fairplay Publications
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3.1 Case studies
The largest of all mergers were between P&O and Nedlloyd, NOL and APL and
Maersk and Sealand, highlights of which are as follows:
3.1.1 P&O – Royal Nedlloyd
The merger of liner operations of the English company P&O with the Dutch operator
Royal Nedlloyd, announced in September 1996, was one of the first major
take-overs in the liner industry in the recent past. This merger sent tremors across
the liner industry as both companies were members of competing alliances. The well
thought out alliances planned for the long-term were just a year old, and this merger
was to make the whole exercise start once again.
The merged entity P&O Nedlloyd controlled a total of 112 vessels with a standing
slot capacity of 224,000 TEU, and some 540,000 containers. The two companies
had a combined turnover of nearly US$ 4 bn and net assets value of US$ 1.5 bn1. It
was a merger in the true sense as both companies were equal owners of the new
entity and the new board equally represented both. Although there were some major
service overlaps, the combined entity covered virtually all the main trade routes in
the world. Both companies made quite a fanfare about the savings of US$ 100 per
teu that would result from the merger. The majority of these savings were to come
from the elimination of 1,400 positions around the world, which were about 15
percent of the combined work force of both the companies. Details of the synergy
expected from the merger are seen in Table 3.2.
                                                
1 Dickey, A. 1996, Sept 10, and Moloney, S. 1996, Sept.10.
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Table 3.2
Estimated Cost Savings – P&O/Nedlloyd
US$ Million p.a. % of Savings
Administration 130 65
Container Fleet 20 10
Route Elimination 20 10
3rd Party Contracts 30 15
Total 200 100
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants
Synergies were achieved without any major hiccups and P&O Nedlloyd declared
that the new entity made a saving of over US$ 200 mn in the first year of operation.
However, merging the two entities was not an easy task and the company incurred a
one-off restructuring cost of US$ 104 mn, which wiped off a substantial part of the
savings incurred from the merger in the first year.2 The company’s 1997 annual
report claimed that ‘P&O Nedlloyd largely retained the customer base of its two
constituent companies’. P&O has definitely benefited from the merger, as it is the
third largest operator in the world today, a position it would have had difficulty in
achieving had it continued on its own.
3.1.2 Neptune Orient Lines – American President Lines
The take-over of APL by the Singaporean national carrier, NOL in November 1997
was surprising as APL was ranked higher than NOL in the container operator rank
list. Although everyone knew APL was up for sale and there had been rumours
floating around about P&O Nedlloyd and then Hapag Lloyd showing interest in APL,
nobody expected NOL to clinch a deal so soon3. Industry watchers were surprised
at the stars and striped Goliath being taken over by an operator smaller in size.
The combined entity of APL-NOL was forecast to have an annual turnover of US$ 4
billion, from lifting of over 2 mn teus in a year. Annual savings from the merger
process were pegged at US$ 130mn for the full year of operation, which was
                                                
2 Drewry Shipping Consultants. 1999, October.
3 Fossey, J. 1997, December.
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roughly US$60 per teu. Synergies expected from the take-over are shown in Table
3.3.
Table 3.3
Estimated Cost Savings – NOL/APL
US$ Million p.a. % of Savings
Administration 45 35
Vessel Operations 30 23
Logistics 30 23
IT 25 19
Total 130 100
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants
NOL claims to have achieved a saving of S’pore$ 180mn in 1998, (about US$
108m) and upped the target to S’pore$ 270mn in 1999.4 Its results have, however,
taken a sharp downturn since the take-over. The deal had not come cheap for NOL
as APL was a respectable name in the industry and NOL had to cough up a huge
premium for the goodwill. It paid close to 50 percent premium over the ruling market
price to APL’s shareholders (24.6 million shares at the rate of US$ 33.5 per share).
NOL incurred a huge debt (S’pore$ 5bn) for financing the take-over and interest
charges on the same (S’pore$ 349mn) had a heavy impact on its bottomline in
1998, the first complete year of joint operations. NOL reported a loss of US$ 245mn
in 1998 but the management reasoned the same as the impact of the Asian crisis,
as the company’s average freight rates across all trade lanes deteriorated by 8
percent that year over 1997 levels. NOL’s management justified the premium paid
as necessary in the face of strong competitive bids.5
NOL hugely benefited from the merger process as it got a strong North American
brand name and a readymade US transport and logistical network built to serve the
Pacific trades. It adopted the APL brand and NOL’s liner business operation today
operates under the name of APL. APL was the pioneer of the double-stack rail
operations in the US, and at the time of sale it was second to none. In the words of
                                                
4 Drewry Shipping Consultants. 1999, October.
5 Neptune Orient Lines, 2000.
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the chairman of the NOL group5 “The company (NOL) came to the realisation some
years ago that it would be impossible to survive if the company continued to
stagnate at a ranking of around 15th among the container lines in the world. To move
up quickly in the ranking among the top ten, which position would be necessary for
survival, merger with another major container shipping line of around the same rank
was the only way”. APL is today ranked as the sixth largest liner operator in the
world.
3.1.3 Maersk Line - Sealand
Denmark’s AP-Moller group’s purchase of Sealand last year was one more
landmark take-over, which led to the disappearance of the last American liner
company from international scene.  The news came as no surprise as AP-Moller’s
Maersk Line and Sealand had been operating in a close alliance for the past few
years, and when news of Sealand being prepared for sale was public, everyone
knew that it had to be Maersk bailing out the ailing company. The US-based CNX
Corp was growing increasingly disenchanted with the group’s liner division operating
under the name of Sealand, as dismal operating margins from this were affecting
CNX’s ability to deliver value to its shareholders. CNX had been increasingly noisy
in public about its unhappiness with the unpredictability of the liner shipping industry.
The split of Sealand into three operating divisions early in 1999, was a harbinger of
things to come in the future and observers knew it was just a matter of time before
one, or other parts of Sealand would be sold off. 6
Sealand was a mega-operator commanding a strong brand name in major trade
routes, hence it had many big names bidding for it. The announcement of major
asset sales by P&O Nedlloyd during 1999 raised expectations of the industry and
industry circles predicted P&O to make a bid. Had P&O acquired Sealand, the
biggest loser would have been Maersk Line, as its carefully built-up global service
network in association with Sealand would then have been endangered. This
consideration might have played a major role in discussions at the Copenhagen
headquarters of Maersk Line, when finally it agreed to take over Sealand at this
                                                
6 Boyes, J.R.C. 1999, September.
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moment last year after years of speculations7. Maersk’s management stated that the
acquisition came naturally as both the companies had been operating in very close
co-operation, and Maersk Line could not have afforded to let Sealand go into the
hands of any of its competitors.
Maersk paid US$ 800 million for Sealand’s international liner business, which in fact
was US$300 mn less than Sealand’s book value.6 Unlike the APL take-over by NOL,
Maersk did not have to pay out heavily for the brand name. The deal included
vessels, containers, selected terminals and certain lease obligations on vessels. The
Domestic shipping services of Sealand were not part of the deal as the US Jones
Act protects those, and CNX was careful to not to attract the wrath of the authorities
in the transaction.
The new entity Maersk-Sealand controls over 600,000 teu capacity, that is about 12
percent of the total world capacity. The company has a clear lead of 200,000 teu
over its closest rival, Evergreen and is double the size of the world’s largest
operator, P&O Nedlloyd. The size of this company can be seen from some of the
statistics. It operates a fleet of 250 vessels, which sailed more than 62.5 million
nautical miles in 1999, equivalent to 2,500 times around the world. The company
made more than 20,000 port calls in 1999, which is about 55 calls every day or two
calls per hour continuously. It operates a container fleet of about 700,000 units
which if put in a line would stretch more than 6,000 kms, the approximate distance
between Paris and New York. Maersk-Sealand has a policy of operating its own
terminals at major locations in the world and today operates 24 container terminals8.
The take-over has been beneficial for Maersk-Sealand in consolidating its position
as the market leader.
3.2 Forces acting behind the mergers
The story of the first, third and sixth largest liner companies in the world shows that
the merger is one sure path to supremacy. While this factor has been one of the
                                                
7 Drewry Shipping Consultants. 1999, October.
8 Maersk-Sealand, 2000.
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major forces behind this consolidation move, there are a number of other motives
too. Some of the factors instigating the merger wave in liner shipping are:
• Intense competition and consistent low margins in liner shipping.
• Low cost being the success factor.
• The Pursuit for gaining economies of scale.
• Limited synergy realisation from alliances.
• Deregulation and privatisation of the industry.
Freight rates in container shipping have been ruling very low in recent times, and
many operators have suffered heavily in the past 2-3 years. Apart from over-
tonnaging, market conditions have been badly affected by the South-east Asia
meltdown three years back. Shipowners in the liner industry, have very little
influence over revenues as no company is in a position to command a premium
pricing. Cutting down on costs is the only way to survive in the long run, and
operators have promptly realised this fact. Achieving economies of scale is a simple
way of bringing down costs, and container shipping is a perfect case of scale
economies, where the rule of the game is ‘big is beautiful’. On the technical side,
scale economies has been the motive behind the move of shipowners to acquire
large vessels. While on the organisational front, these economies of scale can be
fully realised only by way of mergers, and hence the trend. Although alliances and
joint ventures have tried to attain these economies, but the extent of gain in such
cases is limited.9
International consultants ‘Roland Berger & Partners’ state that economies of scale
exist at two levels, namely, technical (ship sizes and systems) and organisational
(scale and scope of companies). On the technical side, economies of scale are the
motive behind companies’ choice of acquiring even larger vessels. When filled (load
factor of at least 80%) a post panamax ship is 6.3% more advantageous in terms of
all-up systems costs, over a panamax vessel. On the organisational side,
economies of scale can be realised in all business processes, with the most
important being sales and documentation, information technology, and container
                                                
9 Ahlander K., Rehling C. 1999, January
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logistics. A company with one million liftings a year has 15% scale advantage over a
carrier one-third its size9. Areas where these synergies can be achieved are as
illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Economies of Scale in Container Shipping
The conference and the alliances systems have not been able to achieve these
synergies. Alliance members share only a significant part of the operating costs like
running the vessel, container expenses, use of terminals, while the potential for
savings on the administrative front remain untapped. Sales and documentation, IT
systems and support, and logistics are some of the areas where alliances have
found it difficult to have any co-operation so as to realise any synergy effect.
Member companies are not forthcoming to share these operations within the
alliance due to the sensitive nature of information these processes handle. This
information is company specific and highly confidential, which mainly includes
customer-related information and rates. A full-scale merger is the only solution if
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companies experiencing increasing cost pressures, want to achieve synergy in
these core processes. Financial benefits accruing from mergers are much higher
than that, which can be achieved from other forms of carrier integration as shown in
Figure 3.2.
Scope of Financial Benefits Accruing from Carrier Integration
Figure 3.2
Mergers also come naturally for the liner industry as it is highly fragmented with the
largest company controlling just a little over 10 percent of the world capacity. There
are a number of small players playing a dominant role in some niches. These small
players do not have pockets deep enough to survive the financial strains from
continuous low freight rates currently witnessed in the industry, and may easily fall
prey to predators. Even for the big players, the changing face of technology and
rising trade volumes in the recent past forced companies to invest heavily in large
new building programmes. With freight rates running low, these companies are
unable to generate sufficient cash flows to service debts, and in order to remain
afloat need partners who can bail them out. These troubled companies are available
cheaply and give the perfect opportunity to financially strong companies to increase
their assets and augment services without a significant drain on their resources.
Another factor forcing strong companies to buy out financially troubled companies is
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to prevent outsiders from buying these and destroy freight rates further by running
these companies at a low cost. Take-overs, in such instances, are defensive in the
sense that the cost of acquisition is less than the potential damage that would be
caused if the troubled company is taken over by some rival. This fear was the
motive behind Hanjin’s take-over of perennial loss maker DSR-Senator lines in 1997
and Maersk’s take-over of Sealand last year.10
One interesting observation related to the three mergers mentioned has been that
while the industry has always complained that the alliances have made liner
shipping a commodity business, brand names have played a very important role in
all of these mergers. P&O Nedlloyd realised that both the individual names of P&O
and Nedlloyd were respectable names among shippers and decided to keep both
the brand names alive. On the other hand P&O Nedlloyd also acquired Blue Star
Lines in 1998, but erased the Blue Star name altogether, bringing all trades under
P&O Nedlloyd. In the case of APL’s acquisition by NOL, APL was a very strong
brand in North American trades, hence NOL had to swallow the bitter pill of bringing
its liner operations under the APL brand and letting the NOL name disappear from
liner shipping. Maersk-Sealand has moved very cautiously with brands when taking
over companies, and while taking over Safmarine it let the company continue as a
separate entity, as Safmarine is a very strong brand in South Africa, and Maersk
could not risk to lose the loyal customers of Safmarine who may not associate
themselves with a new name had all of Safmarine’s activity been brought under the
Maersk umbrella. While the strategy for Safmarine has been different, for Sealand,
Maersk followed the same strategy as P&O and changed its identity from Maersk
Line to Maersk-Sealand.
3.3 The other face of mergers
Mergers and acquisitions are glamorous and we have seen so many companies
jumping on the bandwagon. But companies need to tread cautiously as a bad
acquisition can easily pull a financially strong company into the red due to the lack of
a proper planning process. Even in the most favourable circumstances, mergers are
risky manoeuvres and companies need to have a clear strategic focus before
                                                
10 Drewry Shipping Consultants. 1999, October.
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making any bid. The digestion period is quite tumultuous and without a detailed plan
for the whole process both partners can fall.
Merging companies always dream of regaining the existing market share of both the
entities, but this is never achieved in real life. In the case of a merger 1 plus 1 does
not result in 2. It is 1.7 or something in that range11. This is due to the fact that there
is lot of overlapping in services, and some customers are lost in the process. Some
of the clients may be competitors in their own field, and would not like their goods to
be shipped by the same carrier as their rival’s. Thus partner selection needs careful
study in order to maximise synergies and minimise risks. On the post-merger
scenario, mixing of the operations of two companies may be easy, but when it
comes to the software side i.e. people and the work culture, a proper detailed
execution plan is required, as non-compatibility can be chronic. Moreover, proper
pre and post merger integration is necessary to achieve a timely realisation of
synergies. Non achievement of this will lead to the companies being locked in a time
trap, and will make them pay heavily as the costs of acquisitions are pretty high in
the short run.
3.4 How long will it last
The current wave of consolidation was triggered by the creation of P&O Nedlloyd,
and the industry then predicted that a number of companies would follow suit. The
question now is how long will this last? Are the happenings of the last five years
enough or do we still have few more surprises to come? Drewry12 opines that
countries that are home to several major operators might be on the verge of a
national rationalisation. Thus Japan, Taiwan and also China are to be watched
closely.
Another opinion is that we can expect consolidation within the alliances. Alliance
partners have been operating in close co-ordination and their services complement
each other, hence it makes sense to target one’s own alliance partner which would
                                                
11 Lim, S.M. 1998.
12 Drewry Shipping Consultants. 1999, October.
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be a perfect fit, rather than going for a cross-alliance merger. However, the paradox
here is one would like to buy out a company from the rival alliance so as to create
trouble for that alliance set-up, and unstabilise competitors. Hence it is a debatable
opinion and rumours keep on constantly being floated of some company or the other
up for sale.
Most of the mergers in the past except P&O-Nedlloyd, NOL-APL, and Maersk-
Sealand, have been relatively small. The focus has largely been on north-south
‘niches’ rather than the main east-west trunk trades. The motive behind these small-
scale mergers has been to gain entry or a stronghold in new market areas.
However, if rationalisation has to come to the industry, there has to be mergers
among the big players. The industry still remains fragmented with the top twenty
players controlling a little over half of the world capacity, and just one operator
controlling over 10 percent capacity13. A shake-up within the top league is, therefore,
imminent as operators aim to progress in the rankings. Changes in the top ten
league since 1992 can be seen at Table 3.4.
                                                
13 Fossey, J. 1999, November.
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Table 3.4
World’s Top Ten Liner Operators
Rank 1992 2000
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Evergreen
Sealand
Maersk Line
NYK Line
Mitsui OSK Line
Cosco
Royal Nedlloyd
K-Line
American President Line
Hanjin
Maersk-Sealand
Evergreen
P&O Nedlloyd
Hanjin
Mediterranean Shipping Company
American President Line
Cosco
NYK Line
CP Ships
Zim Line
Three of the top ten companies of 1992, Sealand, Nedlloyd and APL have been
taken over by other big players. Of the current list, rumours about one company or
the other up for sale keep flooding the market. It is a wait and watch game as board
rooms all over the world discuss who will make the next move in this take-over rush.
Another aspect of the big league is that half of the top ten players of 2000 have
taken recourse of the mergers and take-overs route to become big. Maersk-Sealand
and P&O Nedlloyd are the amalgamated entity of parts of their name itself, while
Hanjin has taken over DSR-Senator, APL is the merged entity of NOL and the
earlier APL, and CP Ships has been very active taking over Lykes Line, Contship
Containerline, Ivaran line and ANZDL in the past four years. Thus for companies
dreaming of gaining supremacy and climbing up the super league table, this is the
easier route than having organic growth. One strong believer of this strategy is P&O
Nedlloyd as its management has always expressed its desire to seek industry
consolidation and drive down unit costs through takeovers.
As merger and acquisition news continue to flood the cover pages, the question
remains as to who will be the next candidate.
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4.
Global Trends
In this chapter are discussed some trends which have and will in the future affect
liner business in a big way. While some have affected all businesses, others have
had a dramatic influence on the liner industry that has led to major changes in the
way business is being conducted.
4.1 Current Forces affecting liner shipping
4.1.1 Globalisation - The GATT/ WTO system has brought a significant reduction
or elimination of barriers to trade, through eight rounds of multilateral trade
negotiations. Lower trade barriers have allowed companies to globalise production
structures through investments in foreign land, which has boosted trade. The
technological evolution has increased information flows, which had a profound
impact on a firm’s decision to locate different components of its production
processes in various countries and regions, and still maintain a corporate identity.
Today it so happens that a car sold in one country has been assembled from parts
coming from ten different countries. This has been possible due to the WTO.
1998 marked the 50th anniversary of the GATT, with the world trade witnessing a
seventeen-fold increase since the foundation of this system. On an average annual
basis, merchandise exports grew by 6% in real terms from 1948 to 1997 compared
to an annual average output growth of 3.7%. In other words trade multiplied by the
factor of 17, while GDP grew approximately six-fold during this period. Merchandise
shipped internationally is estimated to have amounted to increase from 490 million
metric tonnes in 1948, to 4,491 mmt in 1997, a ten-fold increase. Countries
propagating the liberalisation policy have realised the benefits of inter-dependence
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upon nations, while the technological revolution has led to an explosion of
productivity and slashed transportation costs. The unit cost of sea freight has
declined by almost 70% in real terms since the mid-eighties, while the unit cost of air
freight has fallen by 3-4 percent over the same period.1
The emergence of global production chains have placed a new set of demands on
liner operators. To the general constraints of providing a regular and frequent
service of adequate quality, a list of other requirements have been added, with
global coverage dominant among them, making liner operations a more extensive,
integrated, faster but not necessarily expensive operation. The globalisation effect
was also able to penetrate the closed and protected world of conferences, with the
emerging low cost operators putting pressure on the conference system.
Globalisation was also one of the major forces behind the evolution of world-wide
alliances as the spread of production facilities and markets required an integrated
global network of services, the pace and magnitude of which made going-it-alone
practically impossible for a carrier. While consortia and pools were the outcome of
investment pressures arising out of containerisation, the alliances are the responses
to the globalisation of production and distribution processes. Globalisation of the
world economy has thus opened up a wide array of opportunities and challenges for
the liner industry to adjust to.2
4.1.2 Deregulation - The world economy is increasingly being deregulated, which
is opening up new trade frontiers for the shipping industry. Markets that were earlier
regulated by national regimes are thrown open to competition. Deregulation
measures like the ‘Ocean Shipping Reforms Act’ (OSRA) 1998, which came into
operation on 1st May 1999 in the USA, has changed the rules of the game
completely and is expected to bring drastic changes in the functioning of liner
companies. Major provisions of the Act are:3
• Of the service contracts to be filed with the Federal Maritime Commission,
certain terms-rates, service commitments, intermodal origin and destinations,
and penalties for non-performance can be kept confidential.
                                                          
1 WTO, 1998.
2 Thanopoulo, H.A. 2000.
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• Tariffs need not be filed with the Federal Maritime Commission, but must be
made publicly available.
• Carriers allowed to negotiate service contracts individually, as a conference or
alliance. Conferences required to permit individual member lines to enter into
service contracts, and contract terms can remain confidential.
• ‘Me-too’ service contract terms no longer mandatory for similarly situated
shippers.
This Act has started an era of individual contracts between carriers and shippers. In
addition, since the terms and rates are now allowed to be different for different
shippers, it is expected that fatter clients will have a price advantage over small
shippers, who can no longer demand ‘me-too’ contracts. Such de-regulations will
change the shape of the liner industry in future.
4.1.3 Alliances - Alliances in the shipping industry have already been discussed in
chapter 2 of this dissertation, and the situation in other industries is discussed here.
Alliances have been a major feature of services industries where companies want to
achieve wider service coverage, without losing individual identity. The airline
industry has identical alliances as shipping. There is the ‘Star Alliance’ of SAS,
Lufthansa, Singapore Airlines among other airlines, and ‘One World Alliance’ of
British Airways, Cathay Pacific, Qantas and others. Benefits of these have been
substantial in terms of overheads as for example SAS looks after Lufthansa’s clients
in the Scandinavian countries in return to Lufthansa looking after SAS’s clientele in
Germany. Both companies thus save on office establishment costs upto some
extent, at common locations. Shipping alliances just share the operational costs and
they can learn from these alliances and try to share the administrative overheads
too.
Alliances have always been shaky not only in shipping but elsewhere too. In
telecommunications first ‘Unisource’ was created by major telecom companies in
Sweden, Holland and Switzerland and was later integrated into the ‘World Partner
                                                                                                                                                                    
3 Federal Maritime Commission, 2000.
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Alliance’, which involved about 25 telecom companies. Then there was the ‘Concert
Alliance’ which started as a partnership between British Telecom and MCI and grew
to include almost 50 companies by 1998. Finally, ‘Global One’ was launched in 1996
by Sprint, Deutsche Telecom and France Telecom. These world scale alliances did
not last long and by the late nineties, all were in disarray. British Telecom has
partnered with AT&T, World Partners is largely defunct and Global One was
wrecked by financial problems.4 There seems to be an identical pattern in the
shipping alliances.
4.1.4 Mergers and Acquisitions - Mergers in the shipping industry have been
discussed in chapter 3 of this dissertation, and the pattern in other industries is
looked at here.
Cross-border mergers have become a do-or-die proposition as companies believe
that to become winners, they have to share economies of scale in manufacturing,
marketing and research and development. One or the other mega merger is
reported on the front pages of the Wall Street Journal or the Financial times
everyday, as every industry is witnessing its share of action:5
• Automobiles - Dalmier-Benz and Chrysler, Ford and Volvo, Renault and Nissan.
• Oil - Exxon and Mobil, BP and Amoco and Arco.
• Pharmaceuticals - Glaxo and SmithKline.
• Communication - Time Warner and America Online.
• Telecommunication - MCI Worldcom and Sprint, Vodafone and Mannesmann.
The impact of this pursuit for consolidation is having wide repercussions on the
shipping industry. The increasing size of these merged entities gives them greater
bargaining power and they are able to dictate terms to the shipping companies. As
cost reduction is the basic objective of most of these mergers the search for further
cost cutting goes to transportation costs too, and these companies bargain for lower
rates. Thus the era of the low freight rates continues.
                                                          
4 Ghemawat, P. and Ghadar, F. 2000.
5 Carey D. 2000.
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4.1.5 Downward trend in freight rates - Incessant price competition has been a
major force in this industry, and freight rates have been going down on all routes
with each passing year. Freight rates usually fall due to over capacity in any sector,
and unfortunately rates in the liner industry hardly crawl back when slot utilisation
increases. Gains accruing from cost cutting measures and declining vessel prices
have quickly been passed over to shippers, and many production facilities and
international markets have been established on the back of low freight rates only.
The industry has to contend with the downward slide in freight rates in the future, as
estimated in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1
Estimated and Forecast average unit rate, East-West market
(Weighted average of transpacific, Europe-Far East and transatlantic trades,
inclusive of THCs and some intermodal charges.)
US$ per teu % change over previous year
1996 1,445 - 5.6
1997 1,294 - 10.4
1998 1,276 -1.4
1999 1,380 + 8.2
2000 1,361 - 1.4
2001 1,397 + 2.6
2002 1,400 + 0.2
2003 1,393 - 0.5
2004 1,392 - 0.1
2005 1,383 - 0.5
Source – Drewry Shipping Consultants
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4.1.6 New Vessel Designs – Innovation in containership design has been an active
feature of this industry. Vessel sizes have increased in the past as shown in Table
4.2.
Table 4.2
Generations of Containerships
Generation First Second Third Fourth
Period Domestic
coastal
services,
before 1966
Short
international
services across
one ocean,
since 1966
Long
international
services over
two or more
oceans, since
1971
Round-the-
world services
since 1984
Territory USA, Australia Advanced
countries, such
as USA,
Europe,
Australia,
Japan etc.
Developing
countries in
South-East
Asia, Middle-
East
World-wide,
including
China, India
and countries
in Africa
Containers Pre-ISO, sizes
17’, 24’, 35’
long
ISO standard
8/8’6”x8x20’/40’
High cube type
9’, 9’6” high
Deviation from
ISO standard
sizes, e.g.45’
Ships Mainly
converted ships
with on-board
cranes
Purpose built
ships of 700-
1500 teu
Purpose built
ships over
2000 teu
Purpose built
ships over
3000 teu
Source: Wijnolst, N., & Waals, F. 1999.
Vessel designs had been restricted to Panamax dimensions till 1998 when the first
post-panamax vessel rolled out. The success of this let designers target the next
geographical constraint, the Suez-Canal and the Suezmax container vessel is
expected to come into service soon. The Suez-Canal is becoming deeper having
been dredged to 17 meters in 1999, from the 6.76 meters when it was inaugurated
in 1869. If the deepening continues, it is expected to reach 21 meters by 2009 which
can allow the Malacca-max, the ultimate container carrier, to be brought into
service.6
                                                          
6 Wijnolst, N., Scholtens, M. & Waals, F. 1999.
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The Malacca-max, a concept designed by Prof. Niko Wijnolst and a team of
students of the Delft University, is the latest in container vessel designs which
dwarfs the current largest carrier, Maersks’ S-Class. The main dimensions of these
vessels will be as shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3
Mega Containership Specifications
Parameters Malacca-max Suez-max S-Class
Loa 400m 400m 346.9m
Lwl 390m 390m -
Lpp 380m 380m 331.5m
Breadth 60m 50m 42.8m
Draft 21m 17.04m 12.1m
Depth 35m 30m 19.3m
Cb 0.62 0.62 -
Displacement 313,571 tonnes 212,194 tonnes -
DWT 242,800 tonnes 157,935 tonnes 104,750 tonnes
Capacity 18,154 teu 11,989 teu 8,700 teu
Vship 25 kn (at 90% MCR) 25 kn 25 kn
Source: Malacca-Max by Prof.N.Wijnolst, and Fairplay Database
The Malacca-max is expected to have approximately 30% cost advantage over a
panamax vessel and 16% over the currently large 8,000 teu vessel. This has enticed
a lot of interest from the shipping community. Critics, however, point out the limited
scope of such a vessel as few ports in the world can accommodate it. Of the
European ports only Rotterdam can accommodate a vessel with 21m draught and in
Asia only Singapore. On the ports, the current gantries have a maximum outreach of
60m, while the Malacca-max requires an outreach of 74m. Next there is no engine
currently available which can deliver the required power and some argue why not
have two vessels which will provide flexibility, instead of having one vessel with two
engines. Apart from the design aspects, the shore-based operations should also be
equipped to handle the fast turn around of so many containers. While these
arguments are currently impending the introduction of the Malacca-max, the industry
may have to contend with the Suezmax container vessel as Lloyds Register has
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recently released the concept of such a vessel and ship owners have shown interest
in the project.7
4.1.7 Supply Chain Management - Globalisation of the world economy enhanced
the established international exchange networks of finished goods and raw
materials, and the focus has shifted from mere shipping to the organisation of
distribution. Managing the entire process of movement of materials and goods has
become more important than providing just transport. Thus shipping or road haulage
has given in to the more fashionable concept ‘logistics’.
Global shippers demanding fast just-in-time deliveries, now look for carriers which
can handle the whole of their distribution network, and not just provide port-to-port
service. Shipping companies, therefore, have to transform their business operations
and in addition to providing slots on vessels will have to provide value added
services like packaging, warehousing, distribution, logistics consultancy etc. This is
an entirely new business area for liner companies and they face stiff competition
from non-shipping majors like UPS and Federal Express, which are developing as
large supply chain management firms.
4.1.8 Increasing Containerisation - Containerised cargo is the fastest growing
segment in sea transportation (other than cruise) registering a 8.9% per annum
growth during 1980 to 1997, as against 2% by dry bulk, 0.9% by liquid bulk and
0.9% by non-containerised cargo. The conversion of break bulk cargo to containers
has been rising and from a 21% share of containerisation in 1980, 50% of general
cargo moved in containers in 1998. The trend towards putting bulk goods in
containers is accelerating and we see today the pressure on reefer carriers as
bananas and other fruits is increasingly being carried in containers. Operators,
instead of repositioning empty carriers try to put in bulk cargo at cheap prices and
we have waste paper moving in containers into Asia from Europe, and there was an
extreme case of Maersk shipping 20,000 tonnes of wheat in containers from
Denmark to Vietnam in 1998. 8 The degree of containerisation is expected to
                                                          
7 Gray, T. 2000, June.
8 Drewry Shipping Consultants. 2000, October.
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intensify in the future as carriers encourage stuffing in every type of goods they can
in these boxes.
4.1.9 Transshipment - The hub and spoke system is being extended to the relay
system whereby ports are developed at the intersection of the east-west and north-
south route to facilitate transfer of cargo. The ports of Algeciras and Freeport have
been developed as major relay ports in the world. The increasing size of vessels
and the pressure for faster turnaround has led to the development of pure
transshipment hubs, where most of the containers never pass through the terminal
gate. Hubs like Gioia Tauro in Italy, Salalah and Aden in the Gulf have been
developed without any hinterland transport traffic or infrastructure. Singapore is the
transshipment port of the world, handling almost 10m teu more transshipment traffic
than any other port in the world. With transshipment volume accounting for over
80% of container moves in ports like Gioia Tauro, Algeciras, Marsaxlokk, Khor
Fakkan, the trend towards shipping companies cutting down on port calls and
relying more on transshipment is set to accelerate.9
4.2 Futuristic Market Forces
It is foreseen that the industry will also be influenced by the following major
evolutions, which can be termed as global trends, stage II.
Global Village - The WTO is going to have a more profound effect on the world
economy, pulling down trade barriers completely. The whole world will be one
dreamworld society like the European Union, where national boundaries have
almost been removed and some head-way has even been made with a common
currency. Regional organisations like the NAFTA, ASEAN will integrate countries
into one world and there can be a free flow of trade in future.
Virtual Planet - Functions carried out by humans are now performed by computers
and more and more systems will be automated in the future. Organisations will not
be required to deal with human beings in as many instances as at present, as
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artificial intelligence takes over the human factor and personal relations will play a
smaller role in businesses.
Virtual Competition - Shipping companies will in the future have to face stiff
competition from auction houses on the internet which will attract the small shippers.
Net exchanges like www.gocargo.com are increasingly being used by small
shippers, due to the platform they provide for striking a cheap bargain. These
auction houses are slowly gaining acceptance and in future will be a major force
liner companies will have to face.
Customised Services – The growing size of shippers due to mergers gives them
higher bargaining power, and for shipping companies taking up the job of logistics
management, services will have to be customized as per each clients needs.
Shippers will be more demanding and carriers will have to engage their personnel
with the logistics department of shippers and plan their services in synchronisation.
Big clients will demand constant attention and this will evolve into an era of
customised one-to-one marketing for each shipper.
High Powered Propulsion - From steam turbines, the industry has come to diesel
technology for its vessels. Further inventions have covered the use of hydrogen for
generating power and this concept may be extended to the use of nuclear power for
propulsion. This can boost the speed of vessels, but nuclear fission is not eco-
friendly and only if the radio-active wastes from this can be controlled in the future,
will ships be propelled by nuclear technology.
Disposable Containers - Empty container movements is a big expense for carriers.
An expected 15 million teu empties were shipped in 1997, producing 33.5m terminal
lifts. Speculatively this would have cost carriers about US $6.5 billion10. The
imbalance in trade continues and the empty repositioning cost has been rising every
year. Cheap disposable containers which need not be repositioned and boxes which
                                                                                                                                                                    
9 Boyes, J.R.C. 2000, March.
10 Drewry Shipping Consultants. 1999, October.
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can be folded and stacked one over the other so that repositioning becomes cheap,
have been experimented with and these will be extensively used in the future.
Futuristic Handling Operations - Gantry cranes currently being operated will pave
the way for a more mechanised container handling operation which will increase
productivity dramatically. Due to single movement of the boxes at a time there is no
more than about 30 movements an hour per gantry. A suction technology whereby
containers can be picked up and placed on the conveyor belts of the gantry, can
lead to a post-panamax carrier emptied and filled in a span of a few hours, and we
may see such handling operations in the future.
Emergence of the Freight Forwarder - While some predict that freight forwarder will
vanish from the transportation scene and the liner company will take care of the
entire transportation chain, another opinion is that they will grow stronger. As
shipping lines target big clients, the freight forwarder playing the role of intermediary
aggregating small parcels will be able to have the small shippers on his side. By
accumulating, the forwarder can build big cargo volumes and bargain for discounts.
Agencies like UPS, FedEx and DHL are the potential players and the business of
cargo accumulation is set to boom in the future.
E-Commerce - The full potential of the internet is yet to be unleashed in commercial
parlance and in future there will be more business transactions on the net. Few
companies source components over the net today and it is more of busniness-to-
consumer transactions, rather than business-to-business transactions that are
taking place currently. Success of e-stores like Amazon.com encourages companies
to build up a b-2-b virtual network that will integrate vendors, whereby each is
connected to a shared platform for transacting business. This will require
investments in systems, which will result in long-term vendor-client relationships
since the cost of switch-over will be high for both. Thus b-2-b will be a major IT
revolution in the near future.
These are some of the issues, which are expected to have a profound effect on the
liner industry. Shipping companies have been forced to undergo major changes in
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business operations and organisational set-up in the past, and these trends are
going to drain out substantial sums of money from companies in the future. Profit
will, therefore, be always under pressure and at the end of the day it will be the
customer who will reap the benefits of these.
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5.
Indian Scenario
5.1 Development of trade and fleet
Shipping plays a vital role in the development of the Indian economy as it has a
geographic advantage of having about 6,000 km coastline that is studded with 11
major and 139 minor and intermediary ports. It also has a strategic location athwart
one of the world’s main sea routes. Indian trade has been very dependent on
shipping and maritime policies have been framed over the years to purse the aim of
having sufficient domestic tonnage to cater for at least part of the national trade in
the following proportion:1
- 100% of coastal cargo.
- 100% of strategic cargoes like crude oil and oil products on the coast and
also overseas.
- 50% of dry bulk cargoes in overseas trade.
- 40% cargo in liner trade.
The above objectives have been aimed at so as to eventually reduce the
dependence of national trade on foreign ships, ensuring availability of transport
facilities at competitive rates to Indian traders. Indian tonnage, however, has not
grown as has been envisaged and from a tonnage strength of 59 ships of 192,000
grt on the eve of independence in August 1947, the fleet had grown to 510 ships of
7.05m grt (11.49m dwt) by the end of 1999. Participation of Indian bottoms in
carrying national trade has been hovering around 28~30 percent for the last few
years, down from over a 40 percent share achieved in 1987-88.1 The maritime
industry, as well as the state, has adopted a series of measures to increase the
participation of Indian lines in catering for the Indian trade by adopting cargo
                                                
1 INSA, 2000, & SCI, 2000.
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reservation schemes and a policy of buying fob and selling cif by government
departments and public sector enterprises. Regrettably, these measures have not
been successful in enhancing Indian lines participation, which is shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1
Share of Indian Lines in India’s Overseas Trade
Year Gen Cargo Dry Bulk POL &
Products
Total
Indian lines
Total
Trade
Mt % Mt % Mt % Mt % mt
1990-91 2.27 12.6 15.68 24.2 20.91 61.8 38.86 35.5 109.35
1991-92 2.49 12.9 15.14 28.9 23.38 58.2 41.01 36.7 111.80
1992-93 2.47 14.4 13.79 23.3 26.40 57.3 42.66 34.9 122.30
1993-94 2.29 8.8 11.54 20.0 32.24 60.6 46.07 33.6 136.97
1994-95 3.18 9.0 9.78 17.0 29.06 54.3 42.02 28.7 146.55
1995-96 3.56 10.4 10.35 14.5 32.09 53.3 46.00 27.8 166.10
1996-97 4.44 9.8 9.56 16.1 37.28 55.3 51.28 29.8 172.18
1997-98 6.52 12.4 10.98 14.4 46.03 62.3 63.53 31.4 202.44
Note: Percentage figures are the share of Indian ships in respective commodity groups.
Source – Indian National Shipowners’ Association Annual Review, 1998-99.
The Indian fleet has been slow to enter the emerging shipping sectors. This is
evidenced by the fact that while 36 percent of the fleet is comprised of dry bulk and
47 percent of tanker tonnage, cellular container ships aggregating 0.18 m dwt
constitute a mere 1.5 percent of the total tonnage.2 The current state of Indian
tonnage can be described as the stagnation phase as there has hardly been any
increase in tonnage in the last five years. The lack of proper fiscal incentives and
requisite cargo support measures from the state, coupled with the dismal freight
market, are the principal causes for this condition. A large proportion of India’s
overseas fleet (about 26 percent) is over 20 years old while another 25 percent
(approx.) is between 15 and 19 years. India can, however, take pride in having a
younger tonnage as the average age of its cargo carrying fleet is 15 years vis-a-vis
                                                                                                                                         
2 DG Shipping, 2000.
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18 years of the world cargo carrying fleet3. Fleet profile of India as on 1.01.2000 is at
Table 5.2.
Table 5.2
Indian Tonnage Profile as on 1.01.2000
CATEGORY NOS GRT DWT
OVERSEAS
Dry Cargo Liner 31 385,391 524,379
Cellular Container 10 137,849 179,906
Dry Cargo Bulk Carrier 104 2,453,381 4,145,883
Ore Oil Bulk Carrier 3 171,101 311,975
Crude Oil Carrier 35 2,058,069 3,709,325
Product Carrier 42 922,031 1,522,742
Passenger-cum-cargo Vessel 1 8,279 8,820
Acid Carrier 7 110,230 158,983
Timber Carrier 2 7,486 12,564
LPG Carrier 6 118,738 138,122
TOTAL OVERSEAS TONNAGE 241 6,372,555 10,712,699
COASTAL
Dry Cargo Liner 49 54,372 83,900
Tugs 61 18,964 3,261
Dry Cargo Bulk Carrier 12 193,614 305,827
Crude Oil Carrier 2 50,080 82,249
Product Carrier 11 80,038 132,042
Passenger-cum-cargo Vessel 11 66,343 27,882
Passenger Vessel 11 1,879 45
Ethylene Gas Carrier 3 8,725 6,960
Ro-Ro 1 956 1,386
Dredger 13 55,263 0
Offshore supply Vessel 68 72,701 81,188
Specialised Vessel for Offshore 27 76,772 57,187
TOTAL COASTAL TONNAGE 269 679,707 781,927
TOTAL INDIAN TONNAGE 510 7,052,262 11,494,626
Source: Director General of Shipping, India.
                                                
3 INSA, 2000.
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5.2 The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd.
The history of Indian shipping dates back to 1919 when the first Indian shipping
company The Scindia Steam Navigation Co. was founded. After India gained
independence in 1947, the government felt the need for state involvement in this
industry that was so important to the development of the national economy, and
thereby formed a joint venture company, Eastern Shipping Corporation, in 1950, in
partnership with a private shipping major Scindias. The government founded
another shipping company, Western Shipping Corporation, as a fully state owned
venture in 1956. Eventually, in order to secure co-ordination in policy, economy and
efficiency in the long run, both the shipping companies ESC and WSC were merged
to form The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. (SCI), on 2nd October, 1961 as a fully
owned state venture. Upon incorporation, SCI was predominantly a liner company
with a total fleet of 19 vessels.4
Subsequently two more shipping companies, viz. Jayanti Shipping Company and
Mogul Line Ltd., were merged with SCI in 1973 and 1986 respectively. SCI grew in
conformity with international trends, while managing to stay truly Indian, catering to
local needs and environment. It is the country’s premier shipping line today owning a
fleet of 112 vessels of 2.95 million grt (4.94 million dwt), which is over 45 percent of
Indian tonnage in dwt terms. In addition, it mans/manages 27 vessels on behalf of
other agencies. Composition of SCI’s Fleet is at Figure 5.1.5
                                                
4 SCI, 2000. www.shipindia.com
5 SCI, 2000. Fleet position booklet.
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Financially SCI has been stable and due to its presence in more than one sector of
shipping, and the government patronage it has enjoyed in the past, it has been
drawing good returns for its shareholders over the years. As on 1st April, 2000, it has
a paid up capital of Rs.2.82 bn (US$ 62.73 mn) and has Rs.16.9 bn (US$ 375.8mn)
in reserves.6
The liberalisation of the Indian economy in the early nineties saw the government
divesting part of its holding in SCI. It sold off 19 percent of its holding in favour of
financial institutions and public in two tranches in 1992 and 1993. The government is
now looking for the strategic sale of part of its holding so as to bring down its stake
in SCI to 40 percent. Major international and Indian groups have envisaged interest
in picking up the stake.7
On the organisational front, SCI is divided into 3 profit centres and 2 service centres
according to their function. The profit centres are Liner and Passenger Services,
Bulk Carriers and Tankers, and Technical and Off-shore Services, and the service
                                                
6 SCI. 1999. Annual Report, 1998-99.
7 Nadkarni, S. 2000, July 10.
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centres are Finance and Personnel and Administration Divisions. The liner and
passenger services division manages the liner operations of the company.
5.2.1 Liner operations
Of the total of about 80 Indian shipping companies, only 3, viz. Shipping Corporation
of India, Scindia Steamship Navigation Co., and Indian Steamship Co., are licensed
by the government to operate on overseas liner routes. In view of the heavy
investment needs and nonviable operations in an intensely competitive and over
tonnage trade with low freight levels lately, SCI remains the sole operator offering a
network of break bulk and container services. With just one national player to hold
forte, Indian shipping has a dismal record in the liner sector.  The share of Indian
lines in India’s liner trade is a far cry from the 40 percent target set by the planners
and has been languishing at around 10 percent for the last few years as shown in
Table 5.3.
Table 5.3
Share of Indian Lines in India’s overseas Liner Trade
YEAR TOTAL TRADE INDIAN LINES SHARE FOREIGN LINES
(mt) (mt) (%) (mt) (%)
1990-91 18.01 2.27 12.6 15.74 87.4
1991-92 19.30 2.49 12.9 16.81 87.1
1992-93 17.15 2.47 14.4 14.68 85.6
1993-94 26.02 2.29 8.8 23.73 91.2
1994-95 35.33 3.18 9.0 32.15 91.0
1995-96 34.23 3.56 10.4 30.67 89.6
1996-97 45.30 4.44 9.8 40.86 90.2
1997-98 52.58 6.52 12.4 46.06 87.6
Source – Indian National Shipowners’ Association, Annual Review - 1998-99.
SCI has offered a range of services from the Indian sub-continent to all parts of the
world in the past, but the absence of adequate cargoes and advent of
containerisation made it pull out of some sectors. SCI has been a late entrant into
containerisation and had acquired its first cellular container vessel in 1993. Its liner
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fleet as on 1st April, 2000 comprised 4 container and 27 general cargo vessels8 and
the company currently offers services in these sectors:
Break-bulk services Container services
• India - UK Continent • Nhava Sheva - UK Continent
• India - Japan • Nhava Sheva - USA
• India – USA
• India - Mediterranean/Blacksea
• Nhava Sheva – Colombo –
                                Singapore
• Chennai – Colombo
• Calcutta – Colombo
In tune with the trend of forging alliances in the liner industry, SCI has slot sharing
arrangements with the Zim Line of Israel and Yang Ming Line of Taiwan in the India-
UK continent sector, and Contship Containerline in the India-USA sector. The
company has similar arrangements with other companies for its feeder services.
SCI is a member of a few liner conferences and the government has done its bit in
helping SCI secure Indian cargo by implementing the Modified Cargo Support
Scheme in lieu of the mandatory 40:40:20 cargo support provisions of the UN Code
of Conduct for Liner Conferences. The UN Code, however, has hardly made any
difference for SCI due to the voluntary nature of the government’s scheme, which is
not binding on shippers. One of SCI’s strongholds is the India-UK Continent sector
where it has a market share of 15~18%, the highest among members of the India
Pakistan Bangladesh Ceylon (IPBC) conference9. SCI provides a weekly service in
this sector and has received the Lloyd’s publication award in recognition of its
efficiency and as a provider of fast service in this sector.10
SCI has been operating in the Indian market for the last 38 years and has built up an
expertise few Indian companies can match. The Indian National Shipowner’s
Association has noted that9 ‘‘in view of heavy investment needs and unviable
operations in an intensely competitive and over-tonnaged trade with low freight
                                                
8 SCI, 2000. Fleet position.
9 INSA, 2000.
10 SCI, 2000. www.shipindia.com
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levels, no Indian shipping company has so far come up with any proposal to enter
the liner trade on any overseas routes.’’ Being the sole operator for so many years
in the big market the company today has the following strengths:
• Only Indian company operating in the liner market.
• Fleet suited to Indian conditions (market/cargo).
• Extensive network of agents in India and abroad including marketing agents for
cargo canvassing.
• Better understanding of the Indian market due to long-standing contact with
shippers and consignees.
SCI, being a public sector company, has not been market responsive due to the
government patronage it enjoyed in the past, and is unable to protect its market from
being taken away by competitors. International players have been very active in
India and have marginalised SCI on most trade routes. The company’s liner division
seems to be saddled with the following problems:
• Vintage fleet with average age of 19 years with very few container vessels.
• Low level of containerisation, with few owned containers.
• Failure to stick to regular schedules in the combi sector.
• Frequent switchover of ships from various sectors leading to erosion of customer
confidence.
• Lack of market responsive culture.
• Multi-window functioning resulting in confused customers.
• Absence of a proper marketing plan for services. Too much reliance on
outsiders for securing cargo.
• Low adaptation of information technology tools to speed up decision making and
also routine office operations.
• High overheads due to high manning scales on board vessels and at shore
establishments.
The depressed market conditions in the liner sector have taken a heavy toll on all
liner companies in the world and SCI is no exception to this. Its liner operations have
been performing badly in recent times, which has affected the company’s overall
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performance. It registered an operating loss of US$ 9m while contributing US$ 90m
to SCI’s total turnover.11 The liner business the world over is passing through a
tumultuous phase and future performance of the sector is not rosy. Experts predict
that only the big efficient players may survive the current phase of low returns and
the industry will see more consolidation in the future. SCI will have difficulty treading
in its current form and the company needs to decide upon the place that it wants to
secure in the industry. In the wake of falling margins and the resulting consolidation
taking place in the industry, the options available to SCI are analysed in the next
chapter.
                                                
11 Nadkarni, S. 2000, March 30.
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6.
Business Options Before SCI
6.1 Business Portfolio Matrix
Liberalisation of the Indian economy in the nineties fuelled growth of liner trade in
the country, which attracted new global operators to this market. These operators
have been eating into SCI’s market share, which is alarming for the company.
The company has to find out the cause for this loss of market share and try to
recoup its dominant position as before. Placed on a growth matrix, more
commonly known as the BCG matrix1 SCI’s liner business would be as shown in
Figure 6.1.
As per the BCG matrix, business operations of a company can be categorized
under four heads depending on the growth rate of the industry and the firms’
position thereon. Businesses in the ‘question mark’ quadrant having weak market
share in a high growth industry deserve immediate attention and investment so
that they can become ‘stars’, the business in the high growth position. The
                                                          
1 Porter, M.E. (1998). Competitive Advantage.
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question mark segment has the greatest potential for growth and profits, and the
cash required for the turnaround is to be provided by the ‘cash cows’, which are
well established having a strong competitive position in a low growth market. This
business is able to offer services at low input costs due to its established position,
and since much growth is not expected in this business, the surplus generated
need not be re-invested. The ‘dogs’ are businesses with a weak market share in
a low growth industry, which makes them non-profitable. These businesses
should, therefore, be disposed off.
SCI’s liner operations when viewed on this matrix would fall in the ‘question mark’
quadrant, posing the question as to why the company has a low growth rate
when the industry is witnessing strong growth. SCI’s liner operations are of two
types viz. break-bulk and container operations, and the break-bulk business
currently witnessing low growth, falls in the ‘dog’ segment. This business is not
profitable and it does not make commercial sense in putting further investments
in this dying industry. Break-bulk business is disappearing worldwide paving way
for containerisation. Break-bulk today is suited more for project and heavy lift
cargo which is a specialised field, and currently major liner operators have
exposure in container shipping only. It is, therefore, recommended that SCI
dispose off this dying business from its portfolio.
SCI’s container business, falling in the high growth segment is the business of
future. The company has a low market share in this industry and this needs
immediate attention. The potential for growth and thereby profits in this business
is high and the company should thus invest further into it, so that this business
becomes a ‘star’. The required cash has to be provided by the ‘cash cow’.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to identify a cash cow in SCI’s business portfolio as its
other major business areas viz. oil and dry bulk transportation, are very
competitive segments in themselves, and the surplus generated therein has to be
reinvested in that category, so as to maintain their positions.
The liner industry, meanwhile is experiencing the consolidation phase where an
increasing number of companies have merged or been sold off to financially
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strong competitors. In order to survive this merger phase, SCI may decide on any
of the options as discussed hereafter.
6.2 Options Available
Container shipping industry has been the platform for series of experiments as
operators adopt varied strategies for success, and there are a number of case
studies available for benchmarking. Success stories have varied with some
making it to the big league alone, while others finding success in joining hands.
The path to success has not been a cakewalk and SCI has to be prepared to
sustain low returns for years. The option adopted depends upon the market the
company wants to focus and also the degree of independence it wishes to enjoy.
Based on these two functions, the options available to SCI can be seen in Figure
6.2.
6.2.1 Niche operator
A niche has always been the most defensible segment in any industry. The focus
here is very clear on the target customers. SCI can chose upon a niche where it
can be the market leader, and protect its position by raising entry barriers. Such a
niche can be developed either in a regulated market where the government
grants SCI a monopoly, or by offering a unique service in a competitive market.
Figure 6.2 
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SCI has identified a number of niche markets in the Indian Ocean where it offers
feeder services. Due to the poor quality of port infrastructure in India, modern
liner vessels avoid India as a port of call on their east-west itinerary, which leads
to containers destined to and from India to be transshipped through major hubs
like Singapore and Colombo. Indian Cabotage law restricts foreign operators to
move these containers along the Indian coast, and SCI has taken advantage of
these market conditions and built up a huge market of moving containers
between India and Singapore/Colombo.
By adopting the niche option, SCI can concentrate on operating in such niches
where it has locational advantage, and withdraw from mainline routes where
profitability is under pressure. This is a huge market as inter-Asia trade is one of
the biggest markets of container shipping, accounting for more than 20% of the
total container trade in the world2. While most of this trade is concentrated in the
far-east region, SCI can identify the sectors where it can make a breakthrough,
and increase its exposure in those segments.
SCI may also consider building up defensible niches having few big customers as
the focus. Michael Porter has identified three generic strategies shown in Figure
6.33.
                                                          
2 Drewry Shipping Consultants. 1999, October.
3 Porter, M.E. (1998). Competitive Strategy.
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In liner business a cost leadership strategy is easily emulated by competitors,
and a differentiated service is difficult to build4. SCI can, therefore, adopt a
focussed strategy where a market will be developed keeping a particular
customer segment as focus. This will involve a tie-up with some manufacturing
facility in India, which can entrust its logistics operations in this part of world to
SCI. In return SCI will have to offer guaranteed sailing schedules, warehousing
and such facilities so that the manufacturing plant can operate on very low
inventory. The company will have to commit punctuality of schedules and even
run vessels with an extra engine so as to meet any exigencies. This innovative
approach will build up a defendable niche for the company.
Advantages – Operating in such a niche will not be as difficult as trying to make
an impact in the main routes. The Indian market comes as a natural market for
SCI due to its continued presence there in the past, and SCI is also a strong
brand in this part of the world. It would, therefore, be prudent for the company to
identify similar market niches and start its services for the Indian subcontinent.
Stakes involved in this strategy will not be high, as the vessels operated in such
niches will be smaller in size and the number of vessels required will be less too
due to the short services routes leading to quick turnaround time. This will also
mean in operating with less number of containers even. Thus this market focus
may be ideal for a company the current size of SCI.
                                                          
4 Kadar, M.H. & Proost, D.D. 1997, June.
 
Differentiation Cost  Leadership  
F o c  u s  
Strategic Adva ntage  
St
ra
te
gi
c 
Ad
va
nt
ag
e  
Industrywide  
Particular 
Segment On ly  
Unique ness  
Perceived by  the 
customer  
Low cost 
Position  
Figure 6.3  
52
Limitations - Although companies in the past have focussed upon building up
defendable niches and have smooth sailing thereon, the niche strategy suffers
from limitations discussed below:
Destruction of niche markets - The recent spree of mergers and take-overs has
seen a number of small and medium sized operators in defensible niches
disappear. These niches were earlier presumed to have defensive strength but it
was a fight between David and Goliath and the niche operators made an exit
while the business was worth some value. The destruction of niche markets in
the second half of nineties are shown in Table 6.1.5
Table 6.1
Invasion and Destruction of Niche Markets
Niche Market Example Factors Responsible
Indefensible Niches
North-South US/Europe – S.America Shipping deregulation
Trade liberalisation
Transshipment
Reefer Cargo New Zealand – Europe
Caribbean - Europe
Transshipment
Sophisticated reefer
containers
Protected Markets Europe – Pacific Islands
Europe – French Caribbean
Deregulation
Globalisation
Wayport Regions Europe / FE - Mid East Capacity surpluses
Directional imbalances
Transshipment
Defensible Niches
Deep sea Ro-Ro Worldwide Mixed traffic types
Project cargoes
Vehicles
Difficult Markets West Africa Infrastructure limitations
Port inefficiencies
Regulation
Domestic Markets USA (Hawaii, Alaska etc.) Regulation
                                                          
5 Drewry Shipping Consultants. 1999, October.
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With global operators continuing to target small players, it will be difficult for SCI
to defend its niches for long. Few carriers in the world can survive in a niche
market as the UASC operating in the Middle-east heartland, and sooner or later
the big players will have an eye on SCI’s market and the company may not have
the resources to indulge in a fight thereupon.
Susceptibility to take-over - Global carriers in their expansionist mood are
scouting for prey to make an entry into new markets. Such niches are attractive
targets as apart from a readymade market that the predator gets, at times the
take-over is forced due to the brand name. Thus a strong SCI in a niche market
will be more prone to take-over.
Low entry barriers – Since a niche is a small market requiring small capital outlay,
more operators will be forthcoming to make an entry due to lower stake to risk.
Thus the threat of competition runs very high and this will restrict SCI from
charging premium for its services. Super profits will, therefore, not be possible in
such a niche unless protected by government regulations.
6.2.2 Growth Strategy
SCI is a major player in the India-UK sector where it has a market share of over
15 percent in the IPBC Conference6. The company entered this segment with its
own cellular container vessels in the early nineties and has been able to
command this position due to its ability to sustain losses suffered in the initial
years, and built up a strong base thereon. The success of this service gives the
confidence for recommending SCI to spread out its services to other mainline
routes. A growth strategy will mean the company changes its focus from being a
regional player to a major force in the global market. It may sound too ambitious,
but there have been success stories like the Mediterranean Shipping Co.7 and
China Shipping Co.8, which have made it to the big league on their own in a short
                                                          
6 INSA. 2000.
7 Mediterranean Shipping Company. 2000.
8 Cosco Container Lines Co. Ltd. 2000.
54
time. SCI can aim for making it to the big league on its own following either of the
two paths:
• Organic growth
• Acquisition strategy
Organic growth – By adopting this strategy, the company will increase it
services profile and penetrate some of the main trunk routes shown in Figure 6.4.
Apart from the international routes shown inter regional trade is also a big market
and SCI will also have to increase its presence thereon.  This is a long term
business plan whereby detailed targets will have to be set for each of the
following areas:
Fleet expansion – SCI currently owns just 4 container vessels, which is a very
small number compared to international standards. Of the top ten list, the world’s
tenth largest operator Zim Line owns 27 container vessels and has a substantial
number on charter9. SCI to make it to the big league will have to embark on an
expansion spree and start new services. Moreover the mainline routes are
serviced by the post-panamaxes and SCI will have to operate those so as to
achieve scale economies.
                                                          
9 Zim Israel Navigation Company. 2000.
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Containers – World’s largest operator Maersk controls over 700,000 containers
and the tenth largest Zim Line controls 180,000 containers. In contrast SCI
controls less than 20,000 units. For offering global services the company will
have to take control of a huge number of containers through a mix of ownership
and leases.
Marketing – Shipping has traditionally been an industry lacking the glamour as
other services industry like aviation or financial services. Marketing was,
therefore, never paid enough attention in this industry as operators relied upon
brokers and freight forwarders to bring in business. The advent of
containerisation and the fierce competition thereon has, however, made shipping
executives to refer back to lessons learnt at business schools, as operators now
target for big shippers themselves. SCI will thus have to draw out aggressive
marketing plan focussing on the sales and brand building exercise.
Talent - Shipping is not a glamorous profession like information technology, and
SCI is not a company business graduates look forward to. Thus it becomes very
difficult for SCI to attract talented professionals. In order to be competitive, SCI
will have to go in for recruiting professionals from top business schools and
groom them for taking up responsible positions in the company. SCI is blessed
with an in-house training institution, Maritime Training Institute, which is primarily
being utilised for imparting training to seafarers. This academy can design special
training courses based on the lines of institutes like the McDonald’s Hamburger
University near Chicago or Maersk’s International School in Denmark.
Terminals - Global operators depending on the hub and spoke system rely on
transshipment for smooth operation of their services. Container shipping being
highly time sensitive, operators are at risk during transshipment as they lose
control over the boxes during transshipment and are dependent on the port for
fast movement. Although ports are highly efficient and provide the best of
services, some operators do not risk depending upon some outside party like the
port authority, and operate their own terminals. By having own terminals, the liner
operator is in total control of the transportation chain and is able to provide
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guaranteed services to its clients. P&O Nedlloyd, Maersk-Sealand, Evergreen,
Cosco, OOCL, Hanjin and Hyundai are some major companies operating
terminals at ports in strategic locations to their services. The port sector is being
privatised all over the world and SCI can pick up stake in few terminals around
the world to augment its services.
Agency Network - Shipping business has thrived over the years within a set-up
whereby agency functions were performed by third parties located in respective
countries. Apart from attending to the needs of the vessel upon arrival at the port,
the agency also acts as sales agent in respective market. However, the concept
of establishing a brand name for its services has induced major operators to bring
in agency functions in-house, or set-up joint ventures with former agents. The
trend started with companies pressing for exclusive agency functions first, and
then the pressure for having stricter control over the complete transportation
chain is bringing the agency function in-house. This approach has benefited
companies through lower unit overhead costs, and also the freedom of a
selective and flexible rate setting mechanism. The in-house agencies also brings
the company close to its customers and have better understanding of their needs,
and SCI should adopt the same policy.
Systems – The alliances have made it difficult to differentiate between the
services offered by different operators as they share the same vessels offering
the same schedules. Operators in a bid to offer superior services have taken the
fight to the systems platform. They have embraced the latest technology, which
will be of help to shippers to gain competitive advantage. To face global
competition, SCI will have to be IT savvy and offer valuable information to its
clients, which can help them plan out their logistics more efficiently.
Acquisition strategy – Not many companies can claim a growth like the
Mediterranean Shipping Co. which in a span of 30 years has become fifth largest
operator without taking over any company. SCI can follow the takeover path as
adopted by companies CP Ships and embark on a take-over spree, purchasing
existing players. Many promoters are increasingly getting disenchanted with the
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dismal returns of the liner industry and companies are put up for sale at frequent
intervals. SCI can make a move when it finds strategic targets and spread its
exposure to other parts of the globe and thus climb up the ranking very fast.
While the growth strategy can make SCI a formidable player in the international
market, it definitely comes at high costs. First and foremost the company needs
to have the requisite funds for adopting this strategy. The company has to be
careful so as to not to fall into a debt trap. The business plan has to be carefully
formulated and execution of the same may take years. The industry will have
quite a few business cycles during these years and the business plan should not
fall apart in turbulent times. This can make SCI a global player in the liner
shipping industry.
6.2.3 Join Alliance
Co-operation within the industry has been a distinct feature of container shipping,
and today almost all major carriers co-operate with their rivals in some form or
other. SCI in a pursuit to offer wider service coverage with higher frequency can
take this option which will save it from making as large investments as in the
growth option. By this the company can become a respectable player in liner
business and also hold on its forte in the Indian market. Objective of joining an
alliance will be to achieve:
• Wider port coverage
• Higher frequency
• Lower slot costs
SCI has successfully tried co-operation schemes in the past and currently has
slot sharing arrangements in its India-UK continent, India-US mainline routes and
also in its feeder operations. These arrangements have resulted in higher service
frequency without incurring the cost of bringing in extra vessels. On its weekly
India-UK service, SCI is able to provide space on 7 vessels although it has just 3
vessels of its own. Joining an alliance will similarly result in improved services
without bearing the whole investments needs.
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One shortcoming of arrangements currently followed by SCI is, these remain
relatively short term. The partnership is valid on one trade route only and SCI has
different partners on different routes. Working with so many partners does not
result in long lasting relationships and the chances of one or more partners giving
up remains. What the company needs is to have a co-operation stretching
beyond one route or one string, extending up to global coverage. In other words
joining one of the so-called global alliances. By this SCI will be working in tandem
with global players and will have a global coverage. Major advantage coming out
of this will be that SCI will not have to build up a huge fleet to offer global
coverage with higher frequency, and can manage with a modest fleet only. Thus
seeking membership of one of the alliances is proposed as an alternative to the
company.
Joining an alliance, however, will not be easy as SCI is a very small operator in
comparison to the existing alliance members. The numbers are astounding with
the largest alliance, the Grand Alliance operating in 14 loops with 105 vessels,
controls over 400,000 slots.10 SCI to bid for membership of such an alliance will
have to grow up in size to be eligible for membership. Membership in the
alliances is constituted on the basis of the capability of the members, and it runs
on the give-and-take principle. Any member expecting to derive some benefit
from the alliance has in turn to offer something to other members. And that’s slot
capacity in this case. If SCI does not have sufficient slots to offer, then it cannot
expect the alliances to take it as a partner.
Next by joining an alliance SCI will have to forgo the operational independence it
currently enjoys. As a member of one of the alliances, SCI’s route and fleet
expansions will have a bearing on the services offered by the alliance and the
company will have to take this into consideration. Moreover, its existing services
schedules may be amended to suit the requirements of other partners. Next even
if the alliances are long term partnerships, past record has been opposite and the
industry has seen operators switching membership in search of a perfect fit.
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Stability of such alliances, therefore, remains questionable and finding an
appropriate alliance would be difficult for SCI.
6.2.4 Merger
An extreme option that can have wide ranging repercussions on SCI’s overall
structure is to jump onto the merger bandwagon. A merger will entail the current
owners to lose either total or partial control of SCI’s liner business, as the partner
picks up a share of SCI’s equity. For the merger to take place SCI’s liner division
will have to be spun off into another entity and its financial worth be evaluated.
Next, the owners will have to decide either on selling the liner business in total, or
just a partial sale leading to merger or joint operations. Both the options are
discussed below.
Sell-Off - A sale of SCI’s liner business will mean the exit for Indian operators
from international liner scene. Liner shipping is different from other shipping
areas like oil and dry bulk transportation and many countries have seen their
domestic companies die, paving the way for big European and Asian operators.
The latest one has been the sale of Sealand last year, which was the last of
America’s global liner operator. The dismal returns from liner business has
deterred successful shipping nations from committing their funds to this industry,
like the Greek and Norwegians notably known for their skills in shipping have
hardly any significant presence in liner shipping. So India having no presence in
liner shipping will not be any exception. Moreover India does not have much to
lose even, as almost 90% of its overseas liner trade is currently carried on foreign
ships.
Selling-off the liner business at this point of time makes sense as the owners can
get a better price when the business is not doing that bad. Global players are too
big in size and have the power to kill small businesses like SCI (liner operations).
SCI certainly does not have the capability of continuing a fight (a price war or
offering add-on services) with these majors if it ever arises. So SCI’s
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shareholders can opt to strike a good bargain now. Finding out a taker will not be
difficult as there has been a mad scramble for consolidation in the industry and
bigger players are looking for takeover opportunity. The recent sale offer for 40
percent stake in the company by the government attracted good response from
some international groups.11 SCI is an attractive investment for any international
operator as it has a good market share in some routes and a brand that is strong
in the Indian sub-continent.
Merge – In case an outright sale of a strategic business like liner shipping does
not find favor with the Indian government due to the support it accords to Indian
trade, SCI may consider the option of merging with some global operator, so that
jointly they can withstand the challenges posed. This can be in the form of a joint
venture company between SCI’s liner segment and the other company. An equal
sized operator will mean both companies equally represented in the new
company and their combined fleet with an acquisition spree can place them at
some respectable position in the major players league.
SCI already has close co-operation with other operators in sailing schedules but
these arrangements lead to savings in operational cost only. There is repetition of
other land based administration overheads, which are performed by the individual
partners separately. A merger between such partners will mean that in addition to
the common vessels, they will be having the same establishment, personnel and
other systems, which will mean huge savings in overheads. These savings will
come valuable in expanding the services base of the new entity, and in few years
time the new company can grow up to a major liner operator in the world. The
risk involved under this option will be shared and SCI can bank upon the
experiences of its partner.
Both these options are an extreme case of surviving in this industry and currently
this has been the trend in liner shipping. A number of companies have taken the
right decision of quitting the business when the going started to get tough so that
they could strike a good bargain, and not wait till they get marginalised and are
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forced to go for distress sale. SCI has to decide how long can it continue with a
business that has been providing negative returns for the past few years.
Fortunately, SCI has business interests in dry bulk, oil and oil products
transportation and these have been able to compensate for poor performance of
the liner business. This brings down the company’s overall earnings. Additionally,
the Government of India is the largest shareholder in SCI and governments
usually do not think in terms of return on equity. Hence shareholders are not hard
pressing, and SCI has been continuing with this business with low returns when
many of its counterparts around the world have given up. This, however, may not
last long as the government of India has plans for divesting substantial part of its
stake in SCI to some strategic partner, and the new shareholder would certainly
calculate the returns on its investments. We may then see a forced sell-off of
SCI’s liner business.
SCI does not have a huge containership fleet, or other big assets like containers,
chassis etc. Moreover it is saddled with a huge manpower which may deter
potential companies from taking over. For the organisation as a whole, SCI has a
very low market capitalisation with its share price currently hovering around 50
percent premium over the face value. It had a market capitalisation of about
Rs.4,500 mn (US$ 100 mn) in July, 200012. Thus a sale will not bring in
substantial revenue for the shareholders and they may defer this option for the
time being.
On the other hand, the problem of excessive workforce and lack of substantial
tonnage will deter international players from putting forward proposal for merger
too. Big operators will certainly not be interested in a joint venture and will prefer
a controlling stake in the company. Thus a merger with some major operator may
not be forthcoming in the near future.
These are the various strategic options available before this Indian behemoth, if it
wants to survive the consolidation phase in liner shipping.
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7.
Conclusion and Recommendations
7.1 An economic evaluation of options
Of the options discussed, SCI’s owners and management may consider the one
best suited for the company.
Niche operator - SCI is already a dominant player in feeder routes in the Indian sub-
continent and strengthening its position thereon may be a strategic option. The
company currently operates these feeder services on chartered tonnage and to be a
long term player in this market, SCI should commit funds and come up with owned
tonnage. Charter rates for a 1000 teu geared vessel have increased in recent
months reaching US$ 9,000 p.d., against a low of US$ 6,200 p.d. in July 1999, and
US$ 8,000 p.d. in July 1998. Newbuilding prices, on the other hand have come
down to US$ 18 mn currently.1 Estimating a 20 years life for the vessel, capital cost
per day at 10 percent interest rate will be about US$ 5,800 per day. Other costs per
year will be in the range of US$ 720,000 for manning, US$ 300,000 for repairs and
maintenance, US$ 250,000 for stores and supplies, US$ 120,000 for insurance and
about US$ 100,000 other expenses.2 These amounts to about US$ 4,100 p.d.
Owning the vessel will, therefore, cost US$ 9,900 p.d. which is 10 percent higher
than the prevailing charter hire rate. The company can, therefore, operate with a mix
of both owned and chartered tonnage, whereby it can take advantage of the fall in
newbuilding prices and by having tramp tonnage it will be relieved of making big
investments. Funds required for owning the vessels will be small in magnitude and
even if it were to own all the 7 vessels it is currently operating on its 3 feeder routes,
this will be an investment of less than US$ 150 mn. This option may thus be a
strategic fit for a company the size of SCI.
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By adopting this option, SCI will, however, be limited in size and remain a regional
player in Asia. Moreover, the company has been successful in this market due to the
Indian cabotage law, which restricts foreign companies from operating in the Indian
domestic market. Due to the ongoing deregulation all over the world, India may be
forced to relax this law in future. SCI will then face strong competition from foreign
operators, and it may be difficult for a small sized SCI to defend its market then. As
niche markets all over the world are increasingly been destructed by global players,
it is suggested that SCI avoid this option.
Growth Strategy – By opting for the growth strategy, SCI will have to increase its
span of services. It will have to operate in some of the major east-west and north-
south routes where it does not have a presence at present, which will give it a global
coverage. This will mean the company will have to embark upon an acquisition
spree and bring additional tonnage under its command. As has been stated earlier,
for one Asia-Europe string the company will have to bring in at least 8 vessels in the
range of 6,000+ teus, and at a cost of US$ 66 mn for one vessel,3 an investment of
US$528 mn would be required for vessels alone. Additionally, assuming a set of 3
containers per slot the company will have to acquire about 150,000 containers,
which will mean a total investment of about US$750 mn for just one Asia-Europe
string. Next the company will have to invest in terminals and setting up own offices
to replace agents. Thus a growth option will mean investments of huge magnitude
for the company.
SCI already has an acquisition plan for 44 vessels at an investment of US$ 1.3 bn
for the five-year period 1997-20024. This plan is, however, for the whole
organisation, and given the poor track record of raising finances by Indian
companies in the recent past, it is doubtful if SCI can embark upon an expansion
plan of such magnitude for its container shipping business only. Thus, investments
required for this option may prevent SCI from considering this option.
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However, SCI can still follow the growth strategy as there is an increasing trend of
companies relying more on chartered tonnage in the bigger size range, and SCI can
start new services with chartered vessels. By adopting this strategy, SCI will not be
obliged to raise finances for fleet acquisition, and it can follow the same strategy for
acquiring containers. Additionally, due to lack of resources it can postpone the
proposal for owning terminals for a few years, and currently it needs to stress upon
gaining stricter control over the marketing and agency functions only.
This option may seem too ambitious, but a long-term business plan can take SCI to
the big league in few years. The company already has experience in offering break-
bulk and container services in major trade routes from the Indian subcontinent. It
can build upon the expertise developed in these sectors and extend its services to
other trade routes. Moreover, the company has successful operations in dry bulk
and oil transportation, and these strengths form the basis of proposing this option to
SCI.
Join Alliance – Among the major alliances in existence today, a small member like
MISC of the Grand Alliance controls 39,000 slots, and Cho-Yang of United Alliance
controls 52,000 slots.5 SCI currently controls less than 10,000 slots and to join any
such alliances will have to go in for vessels and containers acquisition to be of some
respectable size. Existing alliance members will then see some benefit in having
SCI in their alliance and consider its membership. On the operational front, SCI will
have to have control over its terminal operations and agency functions too. Next it
will have to strengthen its marketing capabilities and office systems to make this
venture commercially successful. Therefore, the company will have to follow the
growth path before planning to join an alliance. Thus this option may not be adopted
by SCI with its current size and operations.
Merge – As already stated a merger will mean an overhaul of SCI current
organisational set-up separating its liner operations. Due to unavailability of
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65
separate financial  information for the liner division, an estimation of the value of
SCI’s liner operations is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
As stated earlier, SCI’s presence in the liner industry is of strategic importance to
the Indian economy, and the Indian government may not accept the proposal of a
sell-off of SCI’s liner business. Next due to a low market capitalisation, the
shareholders will not reap substantial benefits out of a sale, and may not be
interested in going for it. Thus the sale option may not find favour with SCI’s
shareholders and management.
As of merging SCI’s operations with some strategic operator, the partner SCI will be
seeking may be of an identical size as SCI. A stronger partner will be difficult to find
as no big operator will be interested in a company like SCI saddled with problems of
insufficient vessels, and lack of marketing acumen. On the other hand forging a
partnership with a weaker partner will not result in any benefits for SCI. A merger
with an identical sized partner will also not result in sufficient gains for SCI as the
company will still remain a small sized operator as per global standards. SCI
currently owns just 4 container vessels, and after merger the new company can
expect to own say some 10 vessels. Thus the gains will not be sufficient, but on the
other hand, the company will have to forgo the operational freedom it currently
enjoys. A merger will be of benefit to SCI only if it results in a company huge in size
and diverse in operations. Thus SCI may avoid this option for the present.
It is, therefore, proposed that SCI follow the growth option in the short term with the
aim of eventually joining one of the big alliances in the future. This will mean a long-
term business plan focussing each of the areas discussed hereafter.
7.2 Fleet
SCI today owns just four container vessels with a total capacity of less than 7000
teus. In contrast just one S-class vessel has capacity in that range. For competing
on the mainline trade routes SCI needs to operate larger vessels and it has a long
road to cover in this respect. Vessels sizes have been growing bigger in recent
times and the major east-west trade routes are today served by the post-
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panamaxes. Major operators are overhauling their fleet profile, inducting the 6,000+
teu vessel. There were 62 vessels of that size range on order as on July 14, 2000.6
At present SCI lacks the financial muscle for an expansion of this magnitude.
However, while vessel ownership was the in thing in the late eighties, outsourcing
has increasingly been adopted by the industry as an attractive strategy in the
1990’s. Almost all major operators in the world including Maersk-Sealand, P&O
Nedloyd, MSC, CMA-CGM, Zim, K-Line, Hapag-Lloyd, APL, Cosco, Yang Ming rely
heavily on tramp tonnage. SCI can follow the same strategy of reliance on chartered
tonnage. While the containership tramp market was almost exclusively restricted to
vessels below 1,500 teu until 1990, it changed dramatically thereafter and currently
tramp owners are active in the larger size segment including the post-panamax
sector. Bremen based NSB has recently built five 5,600 teu vessels for Hanjin, while
Piraeus based Costamare has become the third largest tramp operator by building
five 6,200 teu vessels for Maersk-Sealand and three 4,800 teu vessels for Hapag
Lloyd.7 The onus of developing such a huge containership charter market goes to
tax saving investment schemes in Germany known as ‘Kommandit Gesellschaft’ or
the ‘KG’ investment fund. The trend towards non-carrier interests supplying capital
for fleet expansion is increasing as can be seen in Table 7.1.
                                                
6 Fairplay Solutions. 2000, August.
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Table 7.1
World Container Fleet Ownership Structure - Actual and Forecast
Year Carrier Fleet
(teu)
% Share Tramp Fleet
(teu)
% Share Total Capacity
(teu)
1991 1,330,991 75.8 424,985 24.2 1,755,976
1992 1,460,473 76.2 455,823 23.8 1,916,296
1993 1,561,204 74.3 540,123 25.7 2,101,327
1994 1,694,344 71.5 676,393 28.5 2,370,737
1995 1,871,149 69.7 812,871 30.3 2,684,020
1996 2,065,135 67.8 983,014 32.2 3,048,149
1997 2,319,876 65.3 1,233,165 34.7 3,553,041
1998 2,616,595 64.9 1,414,937 35.1 4,031,532
1999 2,738,119 64.0 1,540,678 36.0 4,278,797
2000 2,908,493 64.3 1,617,782 35.7 4,526,275
2001 2,999,293 63.4 1,730,707 36.6 4,730,000
2002 3,285,026 62.6 1,965,974 37.4 5,251,000
2003 3,555,771 61.7 2,207,229 38.3 5,763,000
2004 3,780,002 60.9 2,431,998 39.1 6,212,000
2005 3,988,200 60.0 2,658,800 40.0 6,647,000
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd/Howe Robinson Research
Activity in the tramp market has increased lately as charter rates have come down in
recent past and as per Howe Robinson, containership charter rates will prevail lower
than that in the early nineties as shown in figure 7.1.
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SCI has been a late entrant in the tramp market, hiring in some tonnage recently for
its new services. The company can emulate the bigger operators and adopt the
policy of taking vessels on charter and free capital resources for other activities.
Benefits from this will accrue in the form of:
• Ability to undertake expansion and modernisation without any capital outlay
• Free capital resources for investments in other important activity
• Free itself of debt upto some extent
• Enjoy more flexibility which helps in unpredictable market conditions
• Enjoy the security of guaranteed and predictable slot provisions cost
It is, therefore, recommended that SCI take large vessels on long-term charter with
an option for purchase, and for smaller vessels it can be active in the spot market.
7.3 Containers
Starting new services will mean requirement for extra containers for the company,
and SCI will have to augment its fleet of containers. The service pattern of the
company will determine the type of containers it has to acquire, as the Indian trade
is catered more by twenty footers, while forty footers are more in use in the major
east-west routes, and some trades using the forty-five footers even. Operators have
built up competitive edge in providing different types of boxes, with inventions like
the controlled atmosphere reefer and temperature probe fitted containers. SCI will
have to similarly find out shipper’s requirements and come up with suitable
equipments.
Container prices have gone down substantially in recent times with China evolving
as a major production centre. As against a high of US$2,500 for a twenty-footer,
prices were down to US$1,350 in the first quarter of 1999. It is currently hovering in
the range of US$1,500. In consonance with this decline, lease rentals for containers
have come down too in recent times, prevailing at US$0.65 per day in 1999, as
against a peak of US$1.30 in 1995.8
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Ownership of world container inventory is almost equally distributed between
shipowners and container leasing companies and in line with the world trend, SCI
should adopt a mixed approach of owning and leasing containers.
7.4 Marketing
The concept of marketing did not exist at SCI due to the government support it had
in the past. So when competition arose, it had to depend upon third parties like
agents to bring in business and today apart from a small in-house marketing team
SCI has an outside agency, which performs majority of the sales function in India.
Agents perform this function in the foreign market. To be a global player, the
company will have to draw out an aggressive marketing plan stressing upon it sales
activity and the brand name.
Sales:
The sales function has become increasingly critical to liner shipping in recent times
due to the following:
Lack of service differentiation – As the alliances have made container shipping a
commodity business, there is very little differentiation in services offered and the
salesman has a tough time selling the same service as his alliance partners.
Inability to maintain service advantage – Liner market is very fragmented having
fierce competition and operators do not take the risk of being a late entrant. Thus
any service edge developed by one is emulated by all very fast.
Customer Expertise – The growing number of mergers between multinational
companies, which happen to be major clients of liner companies, gives them huge
bargaining power. These clients need constant attention and shipping services have
to be customised to meet their requirements.
Globalisation - Globalisation of the world economy has evolved new markets for
shipping and the fight to capture the emerging markets is fierce, as each operator
wants to have a bigger share of the new market.
As sales function at SCI is performed by outside agency, the company is in a
vulnerable position. It is not in direct contact with its clients and does not know who
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its customers are. Its customers are not loyal to SCI but to the sales agent, and the
company can easily lose them if there arises any friction with its selling agents.
It is therefore recommended that the company takes up the mantle of sales and
devise a long-term strategy, which should be proactive, creating a market out of
every available opportunity, and not be a laggard coming after competition has
already established. It has to be developed with the customer in focus so that they
identify the benefits of shipping with SCI. Ultimately it should result in a win-win
situation for both the parties.
By undertaking the task of evolving a sales strategy, SCI needs to identify the needs
of its customers, both existing and potential. This is a difficult proposition as liner
shipping has a huge customer base and it may be difficult to devise and offer
custom-made services to each consumer. To overcome this, the company needs to
adopt a detailed Consumer Relationship Management Program (CRM). It can be
based on the lines of CRM program adopted at Maersk-Sealand.9
Sales staff at Maersk earlier followed a policy of selling individually to each customer
irrespective of the volume of business generated, thereby paying almost equal
attention and time to all type of customers. This did not make commercial sense and
the sales team was hard pressed for time as most of that was used in replying to
incessant queries of small shippers. The company, thus segmented its 1998 list of
85,522 customers, and found that:
• 5% of customers accounted for 78% of its revenue, and 70% of profits.
• 13% of customers accounted for 14% of its revenue, and 16% of profits.
• 82% of customers accounted for 8% of its revenue, and 14% of profits.
Maersk has now reshaped its sales approach and the top 5% of its clients have
been designated super premium status. They are now treated like kings and since
their number is few (less than 5,000) it is easy for senior executives at Maersk to
pay constant attention to these. The next tier of 13% clients are taken care by
middle level executives, and for the occasional shipper i.e. 82%, the company is
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developing a web based system and which will cater to their needs. This way the
company makes optimum utilisation of its sales team and also pays attention to its
client in accordance with what they deserve.
SCI will have to adopt a similar approach and identify the demographics of its
customers. The 80:20 formula is applicable to all companies, whereby about 20
percent of clients account for 80 percent of a shipping company’s revenue. The
picture will be more or less similar at SCI and it should allocate majority of its
resources for the 20 percent segment. This selected batch of clients should be
prerogative of SCI’s senior management, and the company should strive to build up
partnership with those. These clients need to be assured that SCI is capable of
taking care of their needs, and an occasional call from senior SCI executives will
bring home this point convincingly.
Big clients like Walmart, McDonlad’s or IKEA follow a policy of global sourcing and
do not believe in wasting time dealing with sales people down the line who need to
run back and forth to the office for getting a nod to their decisions. For SCI to
become a global player, its senior staff need to start making customer calls. For the
sales team down the line, there has to be delegation of authority allowing them to
take decisions on the field. This delegation can be on the basis of financial criteria,
whereby the sales team is given the guidelines on how much of bargaining power
they have.
Branding
Container shipping is not industrial shipping business like other shipping segments,
but is a commodity business. The importance of a brand name in this industry is
evident from the huge premium NOL paid for acquiring APL. Liner operators have
off-late realised the importance of a brand name, but the industry has a long way to
go before there’s a brand like Coca-Cola or Marlboro in this industry.
SCI will have to formulate a ‘brand vision’ and aim for the top of mind slot among its
clients. This is an expensive proposition, but it pays handsomely in the long run.
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Advertising is a major brand building avenue and SCI has embarked on a successful
ad campaign in the last few years, which has increased the company’s awareness in
the market. This exercise has to be continued with aggression so that the SCI name
records high recall among shippers, and they call SCI first whenever they have a
shipment.
The brand building exercise has to be looked in as an investment and not expense.
It will create brand loyalty ensuring long term partnerships between SCI and its
clients.
7.5 Talent
A company is as good as the people it has, and SCI in a bid to become a global
player needs to attract the best people. The company is blessed with some of
India’s best professionals in this field already, and drawing out a career path for
them, which would involve rigorous training programs and varied responsibility, will
be beneficial in building up expertise. Training at all levels should be a priority and
special courses may be devised at its training institute in Mumbai.
New recruits and sales executives before being allowed to deal with established
customers should undergo courses at the training center, learning about the
company’s systems and procedures. Each personnel should follow a defined career
path, moving across the company’s different locations and departments. By this they
will develop a hands-on-experience of working in different fields, and learn about the
company’s policies and values.
Retaining good professionals will always be an arduous task, and the company has
to provide benefits, both monetary and otherwise to prevent the best of its people
from quitting. Providing stock options is the most preferred form of retaining talent
and SCI may consider offering the same to its employees.
7.6 Terminals
Of the top five container port operators in the world, two viz. Maersk-Sealand and
P&O Ports have liner interests. SCI to be in control of its operations will have to start
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operating its own terminals. This will be a strategic fit for the company as being in
control of the terminals it can accord berthing preferences to its vessels and manage
transhipments efficiently.
Ports all over the world are being privatised and this is an attractive opportunity for
SCI to pick up stake in a port in a strategic location to its services. To make a start
the company should target ports in the Indian subcontinent. P&O Ports is a strong
player in this region operating container terminals at Nhava-Sheva, Karachi and
Colombo and wining the rights to build at Cochin, Chennai and Kandla.10 SCI will
have to bring in investments and start bidding for terminals offered for private
participation in future so that terminals do not become a bottleneck in its container
operations, and provide synergy in operations.
This is a very expensive proposition as the pace of technological change in ship
designs is very fast and ports have to constantly upgrade equipments to meet the
challenges of changing ship designs. The P&O owned terminal in Nhava-Sheva
handled 345,000 teus during 1999-2000.11 If SCI were to build and operate a
terminal with say 200,000 TEU annual capacity the investments required for
constructing the quay, stacking yard and purchasing the equipment would be in the
range of US$ 37 mn. Additionally annual operating costs which includes labour
charges, port royalty, insurance, overheads etc. will be in the range of US$ 40 per
teu.12 Thus investments required would be huge and SCI has to have strong funds
position before it makes any serious move in this field.
The company may thus consider deferring this aspect in the short term and aim for
owning and operating terminals in future.
7.7 Agency
SCI to become a global operator will have to establish its own agency which will give
the company greater control of its operations, and also a global name. To make a
                                                
10 Nadkarni, S. 2000, July 10.
11 Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust, 2000.
12 Drewry Shipping Consultants, 1998, April.
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start the company should take up agency functions in India, as it is conversant with
the local market conditions, and once established the company can extend this
arrangement to other parts of the world. While the switchover from third party agents
to ownership will take time, the company in order to have a global identity can
meanwhile have partnership agreements with its agents. Benefits accruing from
different arrangements will as shown in Figure 7.2.
SCI has always been working with third party agents, and it is difficult to predict how
successful will the company be in having these functions in-house. Since the agents
work on commission, the motivation at times is higher than having own personnel at
the location, who run the risk of getting complacent. Thus the strategy of owning and
having partnerships would require a strong management control from the head
office. Moreover, in the end it is not necessary to force agents all over the world to
have partnerships. Their past performance may be seen and the company should
continue the existing set-up with selected trustworthy agents who have been giving
excellent service to the company in the past.
Current Third Party Set-up 
• Sells agents brand 
• Costs are variable (commission) 
• Limited control over costs 
• No management control 
• No customers contact 
• No sharing of company’s secrets 
Partnership 
• Sells carriers brand 
• Cost are semi-variable  
• Direct control of costs 
• Joint management 
• Improved client understanding 
• Limited sharing of company’s  
      secrets 
Own Agency 
• Sells - Carriers brand 
• Cost - Fixed 
• Direct control of costs 
• Integrated management 
• Customer Relationship Mgmt 
• Shared secre ts 
Source: Derived from Drewry Shipping Consultants 
Figure 7.2 
Advantages accruing from different Agency Set-ups 
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7.8 Systems
There has been a mad scramble for adapting the best IT systems and some liner
companies have set up separate IT companies for this purpose.  Since ships cannot
be made to sail faster, SCI should aim at gaining competitive edge on the IT
platform. The company needs to assess its core competencies and leverage those
in the e-business environment.  An ideal system will be the one which can take care
of the functions mentioned at Figure 7.3.
The challenge before SCI in developing such a system is a big one, as it has to think
in terms of benefiting its customers by offering these tools. Apart from the necessary
cargo information the company should supply customised options like shipment
analysis and performance data to its customers, which will help their company in
supply chain planning. This will win customer loyalty for SCI.
Embarking upon the growth strategy will be a big challenge for SCI. In addition to
raising finances, steering the company through the growth path will be a big task for
the management. The company should not underestimate the power of the
competition, which will be posing new challenges for SCI to cope with in future.
There has to be, therefore, a strong commitment on the part of the management and
strong backing of the owners, for making the plans successful. This can make SCI a
major liner operator in the world in few years.
Informat ion Technology Network Coverage 
Post 
Schedules 
Shipping 
Advice 
Cargo 
Consolidation  
Customer 
Enquiry Booking Issue Receipt 
Port 
Operation  
Ocean 
Transportation  
Customs 
Clearance 
Inland 
Haulage 
Record 
Deli very Payments 
Figure 7.3  
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